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ABSTRACT

Nedelescu, Daniel M. Ph.D., Purdue University, December 2013. Experimental Studies
of Arbitration Mechanisms and Two-Sided Markets. Major Professor: Timothy Cason.
This dissertation consists of three essays. The first essay is an experimental study
that examines a relative new type of arbitration called α-Final Offer Arbitration. The
second is a theoretical study that introduces inequality aversion as a new explanatory
factor for low agreements rates during disputes under arbitration mechanism. The final
essay analyzes the effects of different polices on the price stricter in a two-sided market
monopoly.
Promising results to improve arbitration used in the field are obtained from
Amended Final Offer Arbitration (AFOA), which outperforms Final-Offer Arbitration
(FOA) and weakly outperforms Conventional Arbitration (CA). The first essay presents
an experiment to evaluate a more general case of AFOA, α-Final Offer Arbitration (αFOA). This mechanism is similar to a second-price auction, which punishes the loser
with a value proportional (α) to the difference between her final offer and the arbitrator’s
fair settlement. The experiment furthermore divides the pool of subjects within a session
into two groups according to their estimated risk preferences in order to assess how the
contract zone depends on the relative risk preferences of the subjects involved in
negotiation.

viii
Although agreement rates overall are low, the results show that α-FOA has a
significantly higher agreement rate than both CA and FOA. Contrary to theoretical
prediction the more risk-averse group of subjects does not have a higher agreement rate
than the less risk-averse group of subjects.
The second essay proposes an as yet unstudied factor to explain disagreements
between disputants under α-Final Offer Arbitration and Conventional Arbitration. Using
a utility function proposed by Fehr & Schmidt (1999) that includes inequality aversion,
the model predicts that two risk-neutral disputants will not reach an agreement if one of
them has positively biased beliefs about the size of the pie.
The third essay investigates the effects of different policies on price structure and
consumer surplus in a two-sided market monopoly. In a laboratory environment, most of
the monopolists charge a price below cost even if there is no threat of new competitors.
A policy that imposes that the monopolist must charge the same price for both sides of
the market decreases the total consumer surplus, while a policy that imposes that prices
must be above costs decreases the total consumer surplus even more. A tax that increases
the cost on one side of the market leads to a decrease in the price that monopolist charges
on the other side of the market. These results suggest that the policymakers should
distinguish between a one-sided and a two-sided market before they impose different
policies.

1

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

This thesis has five chapters. This introductory chapter, a literature review chapter
on types of arbitration, two experimental studies about arbitration mechanisms and twosided markets (chapters 3 and 5), and a theoretical chapter about the effect of inequality
aversion on the agreements rates achieved by various arbitration mechanisms.
Chapter 2 presents different theoretical models of arbitration mechanism that have
been proposed in order to improve the agreements rates obtained under Conventional
Arbitration (CA). Stevens (1966) proposes Final Offer Arbitration (FOA). Under FOA
the arbitrator chooses the final offer submitted by the two disputants that she thinks is
closer to the fair settlement value. Stevens’ (1966) intuition is that because under FOA
the arbitrator cannot split the difference between the final two offers, the disputants try to
submit final offers closer to the arbitrator’s fair settlement. This induces those two final
offers to converge to an agreement. Brams and Merrill (1983) prove that this intuition is
not correct. The two final offers under FOA do not converge to an agreement. Because of
that Brams and Merrill (1986) propose Combined Arbitration (CombA), which is a
combination of CA and FOA. With some assumptions about the distribution function that
describes disputants’ beliefs about the arbitrator’s choice of the fair settlement, the
theoretical prediction for CombA is that two risk-neutral disputants submit final offers
that converge to an agreement. Another arbitration mechanism that has similar theoretical
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predictions is Double-Offer Arbitration (DOA), proposed by Zeng (1996). Zeng (2003)
proposes another type of arbitration, Amended Final Offer Arbitration (AFOA), which
has a more general case called Alpha-Final Offer Arbitration (α-FOA). This type of
arbitration is similar to a second-price auction in the sense that the final outcome of the
arbitration does not depend on the final offer of the winner of the arbitration.
Chapter 3 is an experimental paper about risk preferences and agreements rates
under α-FOA. While several arbitration mechanisms have a theoretical prediction that
two risk-neutral disputants will reach an agreement under that specific arbitration
mechanism, the most used arbitration mechanisms in the field are CA and FOA. However
in laboratory experiments most of these arbitration mechanisms such as CombA or DOA,
do not obtain higher agreement rates than CA. The only arbitration mechanism that
obtains weakly higher agreement rates than CA is AFOA.
AFOA is just a particular case of α-FOA, for which

. For this paper I

compare the agreement rates under α-FOA to the agreement rates under CA, FOA and
under a treatment similar to a strike in which the two disputants get a payoff of $0 if they
do not reach an agreement by themselves. The value of

can be viewed as a

measurement of punishment for the disputant that submits an aggressive final offer and
loses the arbitration. Because I want to give more incentive than under AFOA to the
disputants to reach an agreement by themselves, I choose

. The results indicate that

α-FOA outperforms FOA and CA, but does not reach agreements rate close to the
predicted one (100%) for the more risk-averse group of people.
Another contribution of this paper is that it takes into consideration the risk
preferences of the subjects. If there are risk-seeking subjects in the pool of the experiment,
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they might create a situation in which theoretically there is no contract zone. This leads to
no agreement no matter what the arbitration mechanism is. This paper elicits the risk
preferences of the subjects, ranks the subjects according to their risk preference and splits
the pool of the subjects into a more risk-averse group of subjects (which might include
only risk-averse and risk-neutral subjects) and a less risk-averse group of subjects (which
might include risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-seeking subjects). However, the results
indicate that the agreement rate for the more risk-averse group of subjects is no higher
than the agreement rate for the less risk-averse group of subjects.
Chapter 4 is a theoretical paper that introduces another factor in order to explain
why the agreement rates under different arbitration mechanisms are lower than predicted,
even for risk-neutral and risk-averse individuals. In most experimental studies of the
arbitration mechanism there is also a treatment similar to a strike in which the two
disputants get a payoff of $0 if they do not reach an agreement by themselves. In this
treatment the agreement rates are lower than the predicted ones. While the low agreement
rates under the treatments that involve an arbitration mechanism can be explained by the
mechanism itself, by the risk preferences of disputants or by the disputants’ beliefs about
the arbitrator choice of a fair settlement, in this treatment these factors are not involved.
This suggests that there may be other factors involved in the decision of the two
disputants. My suggestion is that inequality aversion can explain this difference between
the theoretical predictions and the experimental results.
Contrary to previous theoretical predictions, the results shows that two riskneutral disputants with the same beliefs about the arbitrator’s choice of a fair settlement
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do not reach an agreement if they exhibit inequality aversion and if at least one has
positively biased beliefs about the size of the pie.
The last chapter is an experimental study of the effects of different policies on
price structure and on consumer surplus in a two-sided market monopoly. A two-sided
market has counterintuitive properties and regular policies might not have the desired
effects. For example, a monopolist might set a price on one side of the market below cost
not as a predatory pricing strategy, but because that it is the optimal price structure. This
may be true even if there is no threat of a new entry. A policy that restricts the
monopolists’ price to be at or above cost might thus lead to a decrease in consumer
surplus. A policy that restricts the monopolist to set the same price on both sides of the
market might have a similar effect.
The results of the experiment show that most of the monopolists do in fact charge
a price below cost on one side of the market even if there is no threat of new entry. For
the specific parameters implemented in the experiment, a policy that constrains the
monopolists to charge prices at or above costs decreases total consumer surplus by 18.1%.
When the monopolists are constrained to charge the same price on both sides of the
market, total surplus decreases by 10.4%. Contrary to the prediction on would obtain in a
one-sided market monopoly, an increase in cost on one side of the market decreases the
price on the other side of the market by 9.1%.
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW ON TYPE OF ARBITRATION
MECHANISMS

In some economic sectors and occupations, a strike is not allowed as a solution
for a dispute between management and employees. For instance, firefighters are not
allowed to go on strike when negotiating with management for wages or benefits if an
agreement is not reached. In order to solve this type of dispute, both parties are forced by
law to participate in arbitration. The type of arbitration typically still used is CA. After
Stevens (1966) proposed FOA as a new type of arbitration, FOA began being used to
solve disputes. For instance FOA has been utilized since 1974 during Major League
Baseball negotiations between baseball players and team owners. Other arbitration
mechanisms have been proposed, but none are used in practice.
Stevens (1966) observes that CA does not effectively encourage the disputants to
reach an agreement mainly due to Conventional Arbitration's method of "split the
difference" compromise of the arbitrator. As a solution to this problem Stevens (1966)
proposes Final-Offer Arbitration. Comparing to CA where the arbitrator can choose any
value as the final settlement of the arbitration, FOA obliges the arbitrator to choose only
between the final two offers of the disputants. In general under CA, the arbitrator is
inclined to split the difference between the final offers of the disputants. This leads the
disputants to make extreme final offers, in order to get a better final settlement when the
arbitrator splits the difference between the two final offers. Stevens (1966) says that if an
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arbitrator is forced to choose between the final offers of the disputants (and not allowed
to just "split the difference") then there is less incentive for disputants to make extreme
final offers because it would be less likely that the arbitrator would select their offer as a
fair settlement. In addition, FOA encourages disputants to make final offers that are more
likely to converge, allowing disputants to reach an agreement without forcing an
arbitrator to make the final decision.
Brams and Merrill (1983) study the equilibrium strategy for FOA and find that
FOA will not induce the two disputants to converge to the arbitrator's median fair
settlement and it will not cause them to reach an agreement. The intuition is that by
starting with a certain point, the expected gain by making a more flexible offer, in order
to win arbitration, will be smaller than the cost of the disputant would incur by making
the offer more flexible. Brams and Merrill (1983) assume a zero sum game between two
players in which each player tries to maximize her expected payoff given that they have
some beliefs about what the arbitrator thinks is a fair settlement. Both players have the
same beliefs about the arbitrator’s fair settlement and their beliefs are defined as a
probability distribution function. For robustness, they solve the equilibrium strategies for
different distribution functions. The main result is that the optimal final offers are more
dispersed for "flat" distributions and will not converge to an agreement. The two optimal
final offers tend to be separated by two standard deviations. This conclusion is important
because FOA was designed to solve the problem of CA and help the two disputants to
reach an agreement.
Several arbitration mechanisms that predict that the two final offers will converge
and induce an agreement are Combined Arbitration (CombA) proposed by Brams and
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Merrill (1986), Double-Offer Arbitration (DOA) proposed by Zeng et al. (1996) and
Amended Final Offer Arbitration (AFOA) proposed by Zeng (2003).
Brams and Merrill (1986) present a new type of arbitration: Combined Arbitration
(CombA). CombA is a combination of CA and FOA. Under CombA, if the disputants do
not reach an agreement, even after they submit their final offers, one type of arbitration
will be applied depending on arbitrator’s notion of a fair settlement. If the arbitrator's
notion of a fair settlement is between the final offers, then the outcome of the arbitration
is determined using FOA. If this value falls outside of the two offers, the outcome of the
arbitration is determined using CA. The theoretical prediction is that if both parties try to
maximize their expected payoffs, their offers will converge to the median of the
arbitrator’s fair settlement, which is a global equilibrium if the probability distribution is
continuous, unimodal, and symmetric around the median.
Zeng et al (1996) propose Double-Offer Arbitration. For this type or arbitration,
each disputant has to submit two offers: a primary offer

, and a secondary offer

. The

primary offer represents the disputant's final request. The secondary offer represents the
disputant's belief about the arbitrator's fair settlement. If neither of the primary or
secondary offers converge to an agreement, then given these final offers and the value of
her fair settlement

, the arbitrator calculates the value for a criterion function

for

each disputant:
(

| )

|

(

| )

|

|
|

(
(

)(
)(

)

( )
)

( )

The disputant that has a lowest criterion function value wins the arbitration and
the outcome of the arbitration becomes his primary offer. The equations from above show
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that a disputant can minimize his criterion function in two ways. One is to decrease the
difference between his belief about the fair settlement and the real value of the fair
settlement. This will cause the disputant to be less optimistic about the fair settlement.
The second way an individual can minimize his criterion function is to decrease the
difference between his request and his belief about the fair settlement. This causes the
disputant to offer a moderate final request. Zeng et al (1996) shows that the two
secondary offers of the disputants should converge to the median of the distribution
function, which describes the notion of arbitrator’s fair if the arbitrator puts more weight
on the second final offer, i.e.

.

Zeng (2003) presents another arbitration procedure called Amended Final Offer
Arbitration. This new procedure amends FOA and is similar to the second-price auction
proposed by Vickrey (1961). Compared to FOA, where the final outcome of the
arbitration procedure depends on the final offer of the winner of the arbitration, the final
outcome of AFOA depends on the final offer of the loser of the arbitration. Under FOA,
the final offer has two functions: to win the arbitration and to determine the final
settlement. These two functions are not compatible in the sense that a disputant should
select increasing (decreasing) values for the first function, and decreasing (increasing)
values for the second function. Therefor the optimal final offers of the two disputants will
not converge. Under AFOA, the winner of the arbitration procedure is the disputant that
has a final offer closer to the arbitrator fair settlement as in FOA. However the final
outcome of the arbitration is equal to the fair settlement value of the arbitrator minus
(plus) the distance between this value and the final offer of the loser depending if the
winner prefers low (high) outcomes. In this case the two functions are separated because
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the outcome of the arbitration is not determined by disputant’s own final offer, but by his
opponent's final offer. Similar to a second-price auction, the disputant have no constraints
on the value of the outcome when he submits his final offer. His final offer will be
selected with the goal of maximizing his opportunity to win the arbitration. Zeng (2003)
demonstrates that if the arbitrator’s fair settlement is described by continuous and discrete
distribution functions, the final offers will converge to the expected value of the
arbitrator's fair settlement and the two disputants reach an agreement.
Brams and Merrill (1986) assume symmetry in the distribution function of the
arbitrator’s choice of the fair settlement in order to establish the existence of equilibrium
under CombA. Without this assumption, there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. DOA
and AFOA do not need such assumptions for the existence of the equilibrium. The
equilibrium strategy for DOA is the median of the distribution function that describes the
arbitrator’s choice of the fair settlement, while for AFOA it is the expected value of this
distribution function. The different results are due to how the value of the final outcome
of arbitration is calculated under these two arbitration mechanisms. Under DOA, the
arbitrator’s choice of a fair settlement decides who wins the arbitration, but the value of
final outcome is independent of the value of this choice. Under AFOA the value of
arbitrator’s choice also determines the value of the final outcome. Because of this, the
final offers under the two arbitration mechanisms converge to the median and to the
expected value, respectively.
Zeng (2003) also presents a general version of AFOA called Alpha-Final Offer
Arbitration (α-FOA). Similar to AFOA, the two offers converge to the expected value of
the arbitrator's fair settlement, however this distribution function needs to be continuous.
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The difference is that for this type of arbitration, the punishment of the loser can be
lighter or harsher depending on the value of the parameter α. A higher value for α implies
a harsher punishment for the loser. For α-FOA the final outcome of the arbitration is
equal to the value of the fair settlement of the arbitrator minus or plus (depending if the
winner is the “buyer” or “seller”) a proportion (α) of the distance between the “fair
settlement” value and the final offer of the loser.
|
where
For

is the arbitrator’s fair settlement value and
the α-FOA is in fact AFOA. For

|

( )

is the final offer of the loser.

the α-FOA degenerates to CA.
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CHAPTER 3. ALPHA-FINAL OFFER ARBITRATION AND RISK PREFERENCES

3.1

Introduction

When solving disputes, Conventional Arbitration (CA) and Final-Offer
Arbitration (FOA) are the most commonly used methods of arbitration. However,
theoretical predictions show that for these methods, final offers may not converge to
allow for an agreement. Several theoretical arbitration mechanisms have been developed
that can lead to agreement, but they do not outperform CA or FOA in laboratory
experiments. Combined Arbitration (CombA) was proposed by Brams and Merrill (1986)
and Zeng et al. (1996) proposed Double Offer Arbitration (DOA). The most promising
results come from Amended Final Offer Arbitration (AFOA), proposed by Zeng (2003).
Deck et al. (2007) find that in a laboratory experiment AFOA outperforms FOA and
marginally outperforms CA.
In this paper, I present an experiment that evaluates a more general case of AFOA,
α-Final Offer Arbitration (α-FOA). AFOA is just a particular case of α-FOA, where
. This mechanism is similar to a second-price auction, in the sense that the final
outcome value of the arbitration does not depend on the winner’s final offer. Also it
punishes the loser with a value proportional (α) to the difference between her final offer
and the arbitrator’s fair settlement. In order to increase the punishment for the loser of
arbitration, I choose

so the incentive to reach an agreement should be stronger.
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The experiment takes into account the relative risk preferences of the disputants,
which, along with the type of arbitration used, plays an important role in influencing the
outcome of a negotiation. Disputants should avoid arbitration if there is a contract zone, a
region of outcomes that are mutually preferred to arbitration. However, the existence and
the size of a contract zone depend on the risk preferences of the disputants. Zeng (2006)
shows that if one disputant has risk-seeking preferences and has a coefficient of risk
preference larger in absolute value than her opponent, the contract zone will not exist in
CA, FOA or α-FOA. He also proves that if there is a contract zone, ceteris paribus, the
size of the contract zone for α-FOA is larger for any
and larger for any

than the contract zone for CA

than the contract zone for FOA. It is important to account

for the risk preferences of the disputants when evaluating the empirical properties of
these arbitration mechanisms. This experiment is the first to control for this factor.
The experimental results show that even if the agreement rates overall are low, αFOA has significantly higher agreement rate than both CA and FOA. An interesting
observation is related to whether subjects reach an agreement during negotiation or after
they submit their final offers. The results show that the mean for agreement rates after
they submit their final offers for α-FOA is strongly statistically significantly higher than
the mean for agreement rates for both CA and FOA, while the mean for the agreement
rates during negotiations for α-FOA is not statistically significant different than the
agreement rates for FOA, but lower than for CA. This indicates stronger incentives to
reach an agreement under α-FOA relative to CA and FOA. Contrary to theoretical
predictions, the agreement rate of the more risk-averse group of subjects is not greater
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than the agreement rate for the less risk-averse group of subjects for any arbitration
mechanism.
3.2

Literature review

Although theoretically all the new procedures predict convergence, only CA and
FOA are used in practice. Due to a lack of data for the other types of arbitration, in order
to study the other theoretical models one must use a laboratory experiment.
One of the first lab experiments related to arbitration procedures was presented by
Ashenfelter et al. (1992). Ashenfelter et al. (1992) compare the dispute rates between
different alternatives of arbitration like CA, FOA and tri-offer arbitration (in which the
arbitrator selects one of the final offers of the disputants or an offer made by a neutral
fact-finder). There is also a "no arbitration" treatment similar to a "strike" in real life,
which will give a payoff of $0 in cases where the subjects do not reach an agreement. The
subjects from the experiments are paired with the same partner throughout the entire 20
rounds of a session. In each round they have to split a pie by choosing a number between
100 and 500. The key result of the experiment is that FOA has dispute rates at least as
high as in other arbitration mechanisms. This implies that FOA does not improve the
agreement rates as Stevens (1966) suggested. The results also demonstrate that there is an
inverse relationship between the cost of disputes and dispute rates.
My experiment design is similar to the experiment of Dickinson (2004) research
paper in which he studies CombA proposed by Brams and Merrill (1986). His experiment
has four treatments: a no-arbitration treatment (NA) in which the subjects have a payoff
of $0 if they do not reach an agreement, a CA, a FOA, and a CombA treatment. In each
treatment, the specific arbitration type is used in case of a dispute. The subjects are paired
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with the same partner for the entire experiment, which consists of 20 rounds of 2 minute
long intervals, in which subjects had to decide upon the size of a variable

, which

implied that they had to split in two a total of $2. Thru a payoff table they were able to
observe their payoffs depending on the size of the variable . For one partner, the payoff
increases when

increases. For the other partner, the payoff increases when

decreases.

Their payoff table gives a private suggested bargain interval in such a way that the split
of the pie in half ($1 each), is not the half of this interval, in order to avoid a focal point
problem. These intervals are [
is

] and [

], where the split of the pie in half

. If the subjects did not reach an agreement after two minutes, they would go

to arbitration. Each arbitration type was applied for 5 rounds. The order of the arbitration
type was different for different pairs of subjects in order to avoid an order effect, and the
subjects did not know that the arbitration procedure would change after 5 rounds. In case
of arbitration, the fair settlement value was given by a random draw from a normal
distribution with the mean equal to 500 and the standard variation equal to 60. The
distribution was explained to the subjects through a table with 100 past values from this
distribution. Looking at these values, the subjects were able to build some expectations
about what the arbitrator might consider a fair settlement.
Dickinson’s (2004) main results are that the dispute rates are lower for the NA
treatment, which is consistent with Ashenfelter et al. (1992) findings and with the
theoretical prediction that an increase in the cost of arbitration would reduce the dispute
rates. However, different from the theoretical prediction, the difference in dispute rates
between CA and CombA is statistically significant, in the sense that CA has lower
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dispute rates. Also FOA has higher disputes rates than CA, but difference in dispute rates
between CA and FOA is only marginally statistically significant.
In a similar experiment Dickinson (2005) compares DOA with CA and FOA. The
main findings of this paper are that FOA has marginally higher dispute rates when
compared to CA (similar to Ashenfelter et al. (1992) findings) and DOA will not
decrease the dispute rates when compared to CA or FOA.
Deck et al. (2007) compare the dispute rate for CA and FOA with AFOA. Using
data from Deck et al. (2007b), in which they study the effect of the uncertainty value of
bargaining in CA and FOA, they run four more sessions using AFOA. In his experiment,
the bargaining is designed like a negotiation between a worker and a firm over the wage
level. The wage is the payoff for the worker and the firm has a profit equal to a revenue
(which is common knowledge for both firm and worker) minus the wage. The level of the
revenue has some uncertainty: a high revenue level and a low revenue level, each occurs
with probability 50%. Deck et al. (2007) also vary the difference between high revenue
and low revenue, in two different environments. So besides the uncertainty induced by
the arbitrator's choice, they introduce some uncertainty of the surplus. They also consider
the fair settlement of the arbitrator as a random draw from a uniform distribution and not
from a normal distribution as in Ashenfelter et al. (1992) and Dickinson (2005). Another
difference in their experiment design is that they add a cost for arbitration. Their main
finding are that the agreement rates for AFOA are strictly higher than the agreement rates
for FOA and weakly higher than the ones for CA.
Other studies related to arbitration procedures are reported by Dickinson (2006,
2009), and Bolton and Katok (1998). Dickinson (2009) studies the effect of optimism and
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risk preferences over the agreement rates of arbitration. His main findings are that
optimism significantly increases the dispute rates and that risk aversion will not
significantly change the dispute rates. Dickinson (2006) studies the chilling effect of
optimism for FOA. Contrary to Stevens’ (1966) beliefs, the results show that FOA has a
chilling effect over the negotiations. As Brams and Merrill (1983) show, the final two
offers will not converge and negotiation will reach the arbitration stage. In addition,
optimism of the two parties concerning what the arbitrator will deem as a fair settlement
will increase even more the difference between these two final offers. The results of the
experiment confirm this theoretical prediction. He demonstrates that optimism will not
only make subjects who could marginally reach an agreement go to arbitration, but it will
also make subjects who do not reach an agreement submit even more divergent final
offers. Bolton and Katok (1998) study the effects of learning in repeated bargaining
situations, with and without arbitration. Their findings suggest that there is a bargaining
learning effect in both situations, with and without arbitration. Learning is slower when
arbitration is used as compared to a situation with no arbitration.
As presented in Dickinson (2009), two factors that play an important role in
arbitration are optimism and the risk preference of the disputants. In a theoretical paper,
Dickinson (2003) presents why and what the relationship is between these two factors
and the agreements that can be reached in a dispute. The relationship is given by the
contract zone: the region of outcomes which is mutually preferred with certainty by
disputants instead of going for arbitration. In order to examine how these two factors
influence the existence and size of the contract zone Dickinson (2003) presents a simple
bargaining example in which two players must split a “pie”. He first assumes that the first
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player is risk-averse and has a utility function of the form ( )
player is risk-neutral, so his utility function is ( )

where

√ and the second

and

are the amounts

that they obtain from the bargaining process. For a similar example assume that
. In cases where they do not reach an agreement, there will be a lottery that will give
25 units to one player and 75 units to the other player, each with a probability of 50%.
Given the utility functions and this lottery, one can calculate the certainty equivalent for
each player. Any value greater than these certainty equivalent values of each player
makes each player better off than the lottery would.
Taking into consideration that

, there will be an interval of values,

the contract zone, in which both players will prefer to avoid the lottery, interval such as in
Figure 1.
However, if the second player is risk-seeking and his utility function is ( )
then his certainty equivalent value is equal to 55.90. With this certainty equivalent
there is no value that is preferred by both players over the lottery.
In this case, both players would prefer not to reach an agreement and would prefer
the lottery. Similarly to arbitration, there is a contract zone, a region of outcomes that is
mutually preferred by both players when compared to the arbitration procedure. However,
the contract zone depends on disputants' risk preferences. This is an important factor in
arbitration experiments, as different papers have presented (Holt and Laury (2002)) that
in a subject pool, as in everyday bargaining and disputes, there are both risk-seeking
subjects and risk-averse subjects. Risk-seeking subjects, no matter what the arbitration
procedure applied, might force arbitration. Dickinson (2003) discusses the effects of
optimism and pessimism on the subjects. In his example, he changes the probability of

18
the lottery depending on whether a person is an optimist (increasing the probability of
winning the big prize of 75 units) or a pessimist (increasing the probability of winning
the low prize of 25 units). Similarly, the contract zone can change size, and might
disappear, in cases of optimistic subjects.
In order to account for risk preferences of subjects, there are many methods that
can be used to measure risk preferences of subjects in a lab experiment. The most
common method used is the one presented by Holt and Laury (2002) and discussed in
Holt and Laury (2005). The procedure is based on 10 different choices between two
paired lotteries: option A and option B. Option A has a lower variability between the
prizes ($2.00 and $1.60), where option B has a higher variability ($3.85 and $0.10). The
probability of winning the big (small) prize increases (decreases) from 1/10 (9/10) by
1/10 for each choice. Given the expected payoffs of the lotteries subjects should start by
choosing option A and then should change to option B depending on their risk
preferences. Given the number of choices of option A, Holt and Laury (2002) calculate
the relative risk aversion coefficient.
Other procedures used to measure the risk preference of a subject were proposed
by Eckel and Grossman (2008), in which they offer more simplistic lottery choices, and
Andreoni and Harbaugh (2009), in which they present a procedure in which the subjects
have a continuum of choices.
An interesting study about different methods of risk preference elicitation is
Dulleck et al (2011). For their study, they choose to study Holt and Laury's (2002)
method and Andreoni and Harbaugh's (2009). They find that there is a similar
distribution of risk attitudes between the results of Holt and Laury's (2002) experiment
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and their replication of this experiment, but when they compare their results from the
replication of Andreoni and Harbaugh's (2009) experiment, they find a much higher
number of risk neutral subjects: 60% compared to around 25% from Holt and Laury
(2002). These results raise an important question about the veracity of risk elicitation in
an experiment, but to my knowledge these are the best methods available in the literature.
The results are similar to Dave et al.'s (2010) paper in which they study which method is
better to use: a simpler one like Eckel and Grossman's (2008) or a more complex one like
Holt and Laury's (2002). Their results indicate that the answer to this question depends on
the task that an individual is studying. However, even though it was not part of their
research question, they find a difference in preference heterogeneity using the two
methods
3.3

Experiment Design

This experiment has two stages. In the first stage, I elicit the risk preferences of
the subjects by using a lottery-choice experiment similar to the experiment proposed by
Holt and Laury (2002). In the second stage, I utilize a bargaining experiment in which
different types of arbitration are used in order to settle possible impasses in agreements.
For this stage, I use settings similar to Dickinson's experiments but add α-FOA as a new
mechanism.
In the first stage, subjects choose between fifteen pairs of lotteries. One lottery is
a “safer” one and gives a payoff of $1 with a probability of 1. The “riskier” lottery has a
high payoff of $3 and a low payoff of $0. The odds of winning the high payoff will
increase by 1/20 starting from 0/20 chances until 14/20 chances, while the odds of
winning the low payoff will decrease by 1/20 starting with 20/20 chances until 6/20
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chances. The “safer” lottery is called “Option A” and the riskier lottery is called ”Option
B”, as in figure 2.3.
For each of the fifteen pairs, the subjects have to choose between Option A and
Option B. For monetary incentive purposes, at the end of the experiment, one line is
randomly chosen and the subject is paid according to his/her choice. The payment is
postponed until the end of the experiment to avoid a wealth effect. Subjects are also told
that their decisions in this stage will not affect their possible earnings in the next stage of
the experiment.
In theory, and based on the experiment's results, the subjects will choose Option A
for the first states and then, depending on their risk preference, at some point moving
down the list they will switch to Option B. In a few cases subjects switched back and
forth between Option A and Option B (10 out of 95 subjects of this experiment switched
back and forth between these two options).
The purpose of this stage is not to measure the CRRA coefficient, but to be able
to rank the subjects depending on their risk preference from very risk-averse people to
less risk-averse and risk-seeking individuals. The instructions do not mention anything
about that, but based on their choices, at the end of stage one the subjects are separated in
two different groups: more risk-averse and less risk-averse group. As other experiments
have demonstrated, fewer than 50% of individuals are risk-seeking, no matter what risk
elicitation method is used. Grouping the subjects in these two groups means that all of the
risk-seeking people will be in the less risk-averse group. As a result there will be a
contract zone for the group of more risk-averse subjects. By doing this, I am able to run
the second stage of the experiment in such a way that I will not break one assumption of
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different models of arbitration which states that the subjects should be risk-averse or riskneutral. If there are risk-seeking subjects in the model, the theory predicts that the
contract zone can disappear (depending of the risk preferences of both subjects involved
in the bargain) which will lead to a higher disagreement rate as Zeng (2006) showed.
Zeng (2006) calculates the size of the contract zone for each of the following three types
of arbitration CA, FOA, and α-FOA. The formulas are as follows:
α-FOA : [

]

CA : [
FOA : [

( )

]
√
√

( )
√

√

√

√

]

( )

where:
m – is the median of the distribution that describes the beliefs concerning the fair
settlement of the arbitrator;
σ2 - is the variance of the distribution that describes the beliefs concerning the fair
settlement of the arbitrator;
δ – is the CRRA coefficient of the disputants (for FOA, he assumes that both players
have the same coefficient);
C – is the cost of arbitration.
Given these formulas, the length of the contract zone for each type of arbitration
is:
(

)

( )

(

)

( )
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√

( )
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From these formulas, it is apparent that with no cost for arbitration these values
are positive if both players are risk-averse or risk-neutral.
Giving the parameters from the experiment and assuming that the subjects are
slightly risk-averse, the size of the contract zone for each type of arbitration is given in
Table 2.1. As Zeng (2006) demonstrates, α-FOA has the largest contract zone, which
should lead to a higher agreement rate than CA and FOA.
The second stage of this experiment is a multi-treatment stage of bargaining using
different types of arbitration in cases of disagreement.
After the first stage, subjects are randomly assigned to a position of "seller" or
"buyer" and are generically named Player A or Player B for the entire session. Then each
Player A is randomly paired with a Player B from the same type of risk preference group.
Each subject is randomly repaired after each period of the second stage in order to avoid
any strategic effects. Subjects are required to bargain for the value of a variable X. The
"sellers" are better off if the value of X is higher, while the "buyers" are better off if the
value of X is smaller.
They have a payoff table, similar to table 2.2, which shows them what the payoff
is in US dollars for different values of X. Each subject is only able to observe his/her
payoff table, which is the same for each "seller" and for each "buyer". The payoff
functions that describes the relationship between the value of X and monetary payoff are
similar to Dickinson's experiments.
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The payoff function for buyers is:
( )

(

) (

)

[

]

( )

)

[

]

( )

The payoff function for sellers is:
( )

(

) (

In order to avoid a focal point at half of the pie, the sellers have the following
suggestion range for X: [
[

] . Buyers have the following suggestion range:

]. The pie is split in half for values of X equal to 500, which is not the half of

these two intervals.
There are 4 treatments and each treatment has 7 periods1 that consist of 1 minute
bargaining periods. The treatment ordering was varied across sessions, as explained
below. In the case of disagreements at the end of each period, an arbitration sub-stage is
utilized. Each subject must submit a final offer. If a pair does not reach an agreement
after the final offers are submitted, then an arbitration method is applied in order to
decide how to split the pie.
The cost for arbitration in my experiment is zero. One finding of Ashenfelter et al.
(1992) is that dispute rates are inversely related to the cost of arbitration. While Deck et
al. (2007) impose a cost for the disputants that do not reach an agreement by themselves,
Dickinson (2004) does not have such cost. My experiment is similar to Dickinson (2004)
in that I also choose not to have a cost, as imposing a cost for going to arbitration creates
a bigger contract zone and also creates a contract zone in situations in which a contract
zone would otherwise not exist. A situation like this arises when one disputant is risk-

1

For the last 4 sessions out of the total of 8, the treatment α-FOA had 10 periods instead of 7 and the
examples in the instructions included also a graphical representation.
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neutral and the other is slightly a risk-seeker. Without the cost of arbitration, there is no
contract zone in this situation. However, depending upon the size of the cost, the contract
zone might still exist. The main idea of my paper is to have a contract zone only because
of the risk preferences of the subjects, and not because of other factors.
In the first treatment, called NA (no arbitration), if the subjects do not reach an
agreement in the one minute timeframe or after they submit their final offers, the pie is
destroyed and each subject gets $0.
In the second treatment, called CA (conventional arbitration), if the subjects do
not reach an agreement after one minute, they must submit a final offer. If the final offers
converge, then the pie is split at the mean value between the final offers. If the final
offers do not converge, a third party decides how to split the pie. The third party decision
is made by randomly drawing from a (normal) distribution that was previously provided
to the subjects. The value that is drawn will be the final outcome of arbitration. The
subjects are informed about the distribution used through a table with 100 previous
drawings. The table that provides the sample distribution was drawn using the same
distribution that the computer uses during the experiment.
The third treatment, FOA, uses final-offer arbitration in order to solve disputes.
For this treatment, the computer draws a value from the same distribution function as in
the previous treatment, and that value is what is considered the fair settlement value of
the arbitrator. The subject that has the final offer closer to this value will "win" the
dispute and the pie will be split according to his/her final offer.
The last treatment, α-FOA, uses the Alpha-Final Offer Arbitration in order to
settle disputes. For this experiment I use

in order to impose a greater punishment
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for the subject that is further from the fair settlement value. In cases of disagreement after
one minute of negotiation, the subjects have to submit their final offers. The computer
draws a value from the same distribution function as in the previous treatments, and that
value becomes the fair settlement value of the arbitrator. The subject that has a final offer
closer to this value will win the arbitration. However, the value at which the pie will be
split will not be the same as his/her final offer. The value of the final outcome will be
equal to the fair settlement plus (minus) twice the difference between the fair settlement
and the final offer of the other subject for the subject who is the seller (buyer).
In each treatment, the value of the “fair settlement” of the third party will be a
randomly draw from a normal distribution with the mean equal to 500 and the standard
deviation equal to 30. This is the same distribution that Dickinson (2009) used in his
experiment for the treatment with low variance. Using a small standard deviation I am
able to control for some of the optimism of the subjects. Dickinson (2006) demonstrates
that optimism has an important impact on subjects’ decisions in bargaining, but the goal
of this paper is not to study optimism hence the necessity to control for it.
Running an experiment at Purdue University during spring and fall semester of
2012 I used 96 Purdue undergraduate students during 8 sessions of 12 students each.
Each session lasted on average 1 hour and 45 minutes and the average payment was
between $25 and $30 per subject in each session. The program used to run the experiment
was Z-Tree proposed by Fischbacher (2007). All 4 treatments were used in each session,
according to a Replicated Latin Square design.
Hypothesis 1. The agreement rates for more risk-averse groups using α-FOA are
close to 100%.
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The theoretical prediction for α-FOA states that if there are risk-averse or riskneutral individuals in the group, the subjects should be able to reach agreements all of the
time. In Deck et al's (2007) paper, the agreement rates for AFOA do not meet this
expectation, their agreement rates were significantly lower than 100%. One explanation
for this is that the authors do not control for risk preferences and use risk-seeking subjects
in their experiment. In contrast, my experiment will both control for risk preference, and
utilize a greater value for α. Also by using a greater value for α my experiment imposes a
larger punishment for the loser of arbitration, which should lead to higher agreement rates.
Hypothesis 2. The agreement rates in α-FOA are higher than in CA or FOA.
In cases of CA, there is no incentive to reach an agreement because the final
decision does not depend on the subject’s offer, it only depends on what the third party
believes is a “fair” settlement. For FOA, Brams et al (1983) demonstrate that the
equilibrium strategies for the two parties will not converge on what they perceive as a
“fair” settlement from the arbitrator. They use different types of distribution functions to
describe the arbitrator’s notion of what a fair settlement is. So the theoretical predictions
are that α-FOA should perform better than CA or FOA from the point of view of
settlement rates.
Hypothesis 3. The agreement rate in α-FOA for more risk-averse groups is higher
than the agreement rate for less risk-averse groups.
The theory shows that there is an inverse relationship between the size of the
contract zone and the preference for risk: risk-seeking preferences imply lower contract
zones or no contract zone. Zeng (2006) shares the same view as Farber et al. (1989) or
Babcock et al. (1995) that there is a direct relationship between the contract zone and
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agreement rates: lower contract zones, lower agreement rates. So the theoretical
predictions are that for α-FOA the agreement rates should be higher for more risk-averse
individuals than for less risk-averse people.
3.4

Results

Out of 96 subjects, I dropped one set of results from a single subject2.
Result 1. On average the NA offers the highest total agreement rate of 72%,
followed by α-FOA with 35%, CA with 27%, and FOA with 18%.
Using an ANOVA type of analysis, the results show that there is no evidence of a
difference between sessions, but there is an indication that differences in means due to
order of the treatments exist. These differences are explained by the fact that the 4th
treatment of a session has a higher mean than the 1st, 2nd or 3rd treatment of the session.
However, there is a highly statistically significant difference in the means between the
type of treatments. The output of the ANOVA analysis using SAS is presented in table
2.4. A Tukey’s test of the ANOVA analysis shows that the mean for NA treatment is
significantly different than the mean of any of the other treatments, and the means of αFOA and CA treatments are significantly different than the mean of the FOA treatment.
These results regarding the agreement rates are consistent with Deck et al.'s (2007)
results that NA treatment has the highest agreement rate, followed by the agreement rate
for α-FOA (AFOA in Deck et al.’s (2007) study), CA agreement rate and FOA has the
lowest agreement rate

2

It seems that the student did not pay attention to the instructions and made offers of $-1. In addition, he
accepted almost any offer from his counterpart.
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A first observation is that contrary to the theoretical prediction, the α-FOA type of
arbitration will not reach agreement rates close to 100%. Even when the less risk-averse
group of subjects is removed, α-FOA had agreement rates equal to 34% for the more riskaverse subjects.
A non-parametric Wilcoxon Sum Rank exact one-sided test shows that there is a
difference in means between NA treatment and the other treatments (p-value<0.001). The
same test indicates that there is marginally statistically significant difference in means
between α-FOA and CA (p-value=0.122), but there is a highly statistically significant
difference in means between α-FOA and FOA (p-value=0.014).
A session-specific random effect Probit model presented in the next table shows
that there is a strong statistically significant difference in means between α-FOA and NA,
and between α-FOA and FOA, and statistically significant difference in means between
α-FOA and CA. Table 6 displays marginal effects from different models. The first model
is a basic treatment effect model that has α-FOA as a base treatment. The next models
include more explanatory variables in order to control for other factors that might affect
the agreement rates like risk preferences and learning effect. All four models are
consistent that the NA treatment will increase the agreement rates, while CA and FOA
treatments will decrease the agreement rates comparing to α-FOA treatment.
Risk is a binary variable that indicates if the pair of subjects is more risk-averse
(risk=0) or if the pair of subjects is less risk-averse (risk=1). These values were attributed
to each subject after they made their choice in the risk elicitation stage of the experiment
and remained the same for the entire experiment. Period within treatment indicates the
round number within a treatment; Spring-Fall Experiment is a binary variable that
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indicates if the session had the instructions modified and if α-FOA treatment had 10
periods; Female/Male Ratio can take 3 values: 0 if both subjects of a pair are females, 0.5
if one subject is female, one is male, and 1 if both subjects are males; Period within
session is the number of the period within a session.
Last treatment is a dummy variable that has value 1 when the treatment was the
last treatment in a session. ANOVA results indicate that the 4th treatment has higher mean
than the other treatments. The last two variables are two other metrics of the risk
preferences of a pair of subjects: the average number of safe choices of a pair during the
first stage of the experiment, and the average risk order within a session given the number
of safe choices of the subjects that form a pair.
When the treatment is the last treatment in the session increases the agreement
rates, while variables related to risk preferences that should increase the agreements rate,
will decrease the rate contrary to the theoretical prediction.
The conclusion is that these results support hypothesis 2. However, they do not
support hypothesis 1. In order to determine why hypothesis 1 is not supported, I examine
what factors lead subjects in the α-FOA treatment to submit a more aggressive final offer
in the situation when they did not reach an agreement. Their final offer might depend on
the subject’s characteristics, the number of the period within treatment or variables
related to the outcome from the previous period. Table 7 shows a model in which the
final offer of a subject that did not reach an agreement is the dependent variable, while
the independent variables are some of the subject characteristics (risk preference, being
buyer or seller, sex of the subject); a time variable (the number of the periods within the
α-FOA treatment); and some variables that describe the outcome from the last period (if
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the subject reached an agreement or not, the outcome of the previous period, the value of
the random draw in case of no agreement and the final offer of the counterpart in case of
no agreement).
The values of some variables that describe the outcome in the previous period
(outcome, final offer, random draw) have different interpretations for a buyer or for a
seller (i.e. a draw equal to 450 for a buyer means that the draw is in her favor, while for a
seller it means that the draw is not in her favor). Therefor I calculate the distance between
the value of these variables and the point X=500 (the mean of the fair settlement
distribution). A positive distance means that the value of the variable is in her favor,
while a negative value means that it is not in her favor (i.e. a draw/an outcome/a final
offer of 450 has the distance of 50 units for a buyer, but -50 for a seller, while a draw/an
outcome/a final offer of 530 has the distance of -30 units for a buyer and 30 for a seller).
The first model in table 2.7 is an OLS model, while the second model is a time
fixed effects model with clustered standard errors. Contrary to intuition and theoretical
predictions, the only variable that has a coefficient that is statistically significant and
increases the distance of the final offer from the median of the distribution function in the
subject’s favor, making the agreement more difficult, is the variable Type which
represents the type of the subject: buyer or seller. The results from Table 7 indicate that a
switch from seller to buyer will make the subject submit a more aggressive final offer by
15 units. On average, a seller that did not reach an agreement made a final offer of 510,
while a buyer that did not reach an agreement made an offer of 472. This result is not
explained by the fact that the random draw might influence the buyers to be more
optimistic in the estimation of the value for the random draw. The mean of all draws in
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these cases was equal to 500. Likewise there was no selection problem related to subjects’
risk preferences because the subjects were assigned randomly as a buyer or seller. Also
the coefficients of the variables that control for the value of the past draw and the risk
preference of the subjects are not statistically significant and they do not have a large
effect on the final offer. Beliefs elicitation before subjects submit their final offer might
help us understand why the subjects made such an offer.
Another explanation why hypothesis 1 is not supported might be related to the
mechanism itself. Even if α-FOA appears to be a relatively simple mechanism, the
subjects might not understand that the value of the final outcome does not depend on
their final offer and that their final offer determines only if they win or lose the arbitration.
Beside the decision that the subjects had to take during the experiment in each of
the two stages, the subjects had to answer to several quiz questions about the instructions.
The questions were prior to the first stage, and before each treatment of the second stage.
For the correctness of the answers, it is important to mention that there was no monetary
incentive for subjects to give the best answer, the purpose of these questions is to help
them understand the instructions better.
The first stage had 3 quiz questions. For the first question 75% of the subjects
gave the correct answer, for the second question 96% and for the last one 98%. Only one
subject switched back and forth between Option A and Option B, out of all subjects that
gave at least one wrong answer. For CA and FOA treatments there was just one question
per treatment and the percentages of correct answers were 81.3% and 92.7%, respectively.
For NA and α-FOA treatments there were two questions per treatment. For the NA
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treatment the percentage of correct answers was at the same level as the other two
treatments: 72.9% for the first question and 96.9% for the second question.
However for the α-FOA the percentage of the correct answers dropped to 21.9%
for the first question and 36.5% for the second question. Given that they did not have any
monetary incentive to try to calculate the exact value, I calculate the percentage of
students that gave an approximate answer (that means that they understood which player
from their example won the arbitration and they chose a value close to the correct
answer). In that case, the percentage of an approximate answer is 76.0% for the first
question and 69.8% for the second question. Given these results, my suggestion is that
the subjects did not totally understand how this arbitration mechanism works.
A stage that will elicit subjects’ beliefs before they submit their final offers might
offer insights regarding if they understood the mechanism and also regarding their
optimism about the random draw, a factor that Dickinson (2009) shows that affects the
outcome of the arbitration.
Result 2. Agreement rate after the subjects submit their final offers for α-FOA
treatment is statistically different than the mean for CA or FOA treatments.
This result does not concern the main research questions of this paper and is
related to the moment in time when the subjects reached an agreement during the
arbitration procedure. The subjects were able to reach an agreement during the two
different stages of arbitration. The first stage is the negotiation stage before the subjects
submitted their final offers, and they can reach an agreement by accepting the last offer
made by their counterpart. They were also able to reach an agreement after they
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submitted their final offers, in cases where their final offers crossed-over. In other words
they were able to reach an agreement before or after they submitted their final offers.
A Wilcoxon Sum Rank exact one-sided test shows that the mean for agreement
rates after the subjects submitted their final offers for α-FOA is strongly statistically
different than the mean for CA (p-value=0.0023) and the mean for FOA (p-value<0.001).
Moreover, the agreement rate after the final offers were submitted for FOA is almost zero.
On the other hand there is no difference in mean between agreement rates before the
subjects submitted the final offer for α-FOA and FOA (p-value=0.3281), and there is a
statistically significant difference in the means between agreement rates for α-FOA and
CA (p-value=0.0079). This might imply that during the negotiation the subjects behave
almost the same no matter what arbitration procedure is applied, but once they have to
submit their final offers, they are more willing to reach an agreement under α-FOA. So αFOA offers more incentives to reach an agreement as theory predicts but these incentives
are not strong enough during negotiation process, but become stronger once the subjects
have to submit their final offers.
Result 3. More risk-averse groups of subjects do not have higher agreement rates
than less risk-averse groups of subjects.
The distribution of subjects by the number of safe choices from the first stage of
the experiment is shown in Figure 2.6 for the two groups of subjects.
On average the more risk-averse subjects choose 10.28 safe choices while the less
risk-averse subjects choose 7.02 safe choices. The graph below and the means show that
most of the subjects are risk-averse. Due to the settings of the risk elicitation method, a
risk-neutral subject should have 6 safe choices before she starts to choose the risky option.
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Given subjects’ choices during the risk elicitation stage, I calculate if a contract
zone exists for each pair in each period. For the four sessions from spring of 2012 there
were 4.5% cases in which there was no contract zone. All these cases were for the less
risk-averse group of subjects. However, for the four sessions from fall 2012 this
percentage was significantly higher: 20.3%. This high percentage is mainly due to subject
11 from session 7 and subject 10 of session 8, who may not have correctly understood
the task from the risk elicitation stage. Both subjects chose only the risky option even for
the cases in which the risky option earned them $0 with certainty, compared to $1 from
the safe option (they chose option B even for line 1 from figure 2.3). Due to their choices,
there is no contract zone for any pair which included one of them. Without taking into
account their cases, 12% of cases resulted in no contract zone for the last four sessions.
While theory predicts that, due to the lack of a contract zone, the more riskaverse group of subjects should have a higher agreement rate than the less risk-averse
group of subjects, the results do not support this prediction.
The same non-parametric test shows that there is a difference in the means of the
agreements rates between more risk-averse groups of subjects and less risk-averse groups
of students for CA (p-values=0.0149) and FOA (p-values=0.0618) types of arbitration.
The agreement rate for more risk-averse group of subjects is smaller than the agreement
rate for the less risk-averse group of subjects. For the α-FOA type of arbitration there is
just a marginally significant difference in means, p-values=0.1048, while for the NA
treatment there is no difference in means for the agreement rates between more riskaverse group of subjects and less risk-averse group of subjects.
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This result is consistent with the Probit models from columns 3 and 4 from Table
2.6. In both models, the coefficient for the variable that measures the risk preference of a
pair of subjects is negative and statistically significant. Because the value for both
variables increases when a pair is more risk-averse, the coefficient indicates that the
agreement rate will decrease when a pair of subjects is more risk-averse.
This result is contrary to the theoretical prediction that implies that more riskaverse people should reach an agreement more frequently than less risk-averse people.
These results fail to support hypothesis 3.
One explanation why hypothesis 3 is not supported might be the method used for
risk elicitation. As discussed above in section 2, papers have shown that the distribution
of risk preferences can be quite different even for the same type of task when using
different methods. A new method using arbitration in order to elicit risk preferences
might be more appropriate. Another explanation is optimism. Even though the design of
my experiment tried to control for optimism by using a small standard deviation for the
normal distribution that describes the notion of the fair settlement of the arbitrator, the
subjects can still be biased by the median of this distribution, which leads to disputes. A
solution to this problem would be to elicit their beliefs about the draw of the value for the
fair settlement, similar to Dickinson (2009), and to see if the subjects were biased or if
they were just aggressive in negotiations.
Another way to investigate the problem of risk preferences in arbitration
mechanisms is to take a similar approach to Brunner et al. (2013). Brunner et al. (2013)
study the effect of

risk preferences in English premium auctions. They asked 368

subjects to participate in an online risk elicitation method survey on Charlie Holt’s Vecon
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website. Out of the 368 subjects, 48 observations were discarded because they were
incomplete or inconsistent. Due the low number of risk-seeking subjects from the rest
320 subjects they used only 40 subjects for the main experiment. The subjects were then
classified as risk-averse (with 7, 8 or 9 safe choices out of 10) or as risk-seeking (0-3 safe
choices). With a design similar to that the theoretical prediction is that the contract zone
does not exist for any pair of the risk-seeking group of subjects while it exits for all pairs
of the risk-averse group of subjects. The only problem with this approach is the high cost
of the risk elicitation stage.
3.5

Conclusions

Starting with Stevens (1966) a few arbitration mechanisms were proposed instead
of CA, mechanisms that should improve agreement rates, but most of them did not reach
higher agreement rates compared to CA, in practice or in lab experiments. A promising
arbitration mechanism that offers marginally higher agreement rates compared to CA is
AFOA proposed by Zeng (2003). In their experimental study, Deck et al. (2007) show
that the agreement rate for AFOA is strictly higher than the agreement rate for FOA and
weakly higher than the one for CA.
In this paper, I study a more general case of AFOA proposed by Zeng (2003)
called α-FOA and also take into account the risk preferences of the subjects due to the
fact that the existence of the contract zone depends on the risk preferences of the subjects.
α-FOA is similar to a “second-price” auction in the sense that the value of the subject’s
final offer determines only if she wins the arbitration, but the value of the outcome of the
arbitration depends on the value of the final offer of her counterpart. Due to this property,
compared to FOA, α-FOA separates the two functions of the final offer: to win the
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arbitration and to obtain a favorable outcome after the arbitration. Compared to AFOA
that offers the same property, α-FOA allows for changes in the punishment of a subject
that is aggressive with her final offer in order to create stronger incentives to reach an
agreement. With regard to the contract zone, α-FOA offers the largest contract zone for
risk-neutral and risk-averse subjects compared to the other arbitration methods.
The experiment of this study is similar to the experiment of Dickinson (2004).
Subjects are randomly assigned the role of a buyer or seller and each buyer is randomly
paired each period with a seller. For each round, they have to agree upon the value of a
variable X, a variable that offers high payoffs when it takes low values for buyers and
high payoffs when it takes high values for sellers. If subjects do not reach an agreement
in a one minute period, they have to submit their final offers. If these final offers do not
cross-over to indicate an agreement, one of the arbitration mechanisms is applied in order
to determine the outcome of that round. In addition, at the beginning of a session I elicit
the subjects’ risk preferences and split them into two groups, more risk-averse and less
risk-averse, in order to have in the more risk-averse group of subjects only risk-neutral
and risk-averse subjects and guarantee the existence of a contract zone.
The results of the experiment show that α-FOA has on average a higher
agreement rate than CA or FOA. A non-parametric test shows that the agreement rate for
α-FOA is statistically significantly greater than the agreement rate for FOA and weakly
statistically significantly greater than the agreement rate for CA. A session-specific
random effect Probit model shows that there is a strong statistically significant difference
in means between α-FOA and FOA, and statistically significant difference in means
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between α-FOA and CA. Contrary to the theoretical prediction risk preferences have the
opposite impact on the agreement rates for these arbitration mechanisms.
Despite the fact that α-FOA looks really promising in a laboratory experiment
environment, future research should focus on finding an answer that will explain the
difference in agreement rates between the theoretical prediction and the results obtain in a
laboratory experiment. Also, I suggest that future studies of arbitration mechanisms
should develop and use a better risk elicitation method.
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Figure 3.1 Contract zone for a risk-averse and a risk-neutral player.
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Figure 3.2 No contract zone for a risk-averse and a risk-seeking player
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Figure 3.3 Screen shot of the risk elicitation stage
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Agreement rates %
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Figure 3.4 Note: Actual treatment order varied for different sessions.
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Agreement rates before and after final offers
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Figure 3.5 Agreement rates before and after final offers
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Number of subjects

Number of safe choices (out of total of 15)
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Figure 3.6 - The distribution of subjects by the number of safe choices
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Agreement rates for more and less risk averse
groups of subjects
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Figure 3.7 Agreement rate for more and less risk-averse group of subjects
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Table 3.1 Size of the contract zone
Mean
α-FOA
CA
FOA

500
500
500

Std.
dev.
30
30
30

0.1
0.1
0.1

0.1
0.1
0.1

Cost

α

0
0
0

2
-

Low
limit
365.0
455.0
499.1

Contract zone
High
limit
Size
635.0 270.0
545.0
90.0
500.9
1.8

% of
"pie"
67.5%
22.5%
0.5%

49
Table 3.2 The payoff tables for player A and player B
Player A
Player B
Value of
Value of
X
Payoff
X
Payoff
300 $0.00
200 $2.50
350 $0.25
250 $2.25
400 $0.50
300 $2.00
450 $0.75
350 $1.75
500 $1.00
400 $1.50
550 $1.25
450 $1.25
600 $1.50
500 $1.00
650 $1.75
550 $0.75
700 $2.00
600 $0.50
750 $2.25
650 $0.25
800 $2.50
700 $0.00

50
Table 3.3 The order of treatments in each session according to Latin Square design
Session number

Order in
the
session

1

2

3

4

1st

CA

FOA

α-FOA

NA

2nd

FOA

α-FOA

NA

CA

3rd

α-FOA

NA

CA

FOA

4th

NA

CA

FOA

α-FOA
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Table 3.4 ANOVA output
Source
Treatment
Session
Order

DF
3
6
3

Type III SS
12710.375
987.875
812.625

Mean Square

F Value

4236.791
164.645
270.875

46.95
1.82
3.00

Pr> F
<.0001
0.1507
0.0577
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Arbitration
type
NA
CA
FOA
α-FOA

Table 3.5 Agreement rates per treatment in each session
Session number
1
2
3
4
5
6
69%
60%
69%
74%
83%
90%
12%
34%
24%
31%
19%
12%
7%
6%
29%
19%
10%
14%
29%
17%
31%
40%
42%
25%

7
76%
50%
31%
52%

8
55%
36%
24%
40%
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Table 3.6 Marginal effects - Random Effect Probit models
(1)
(2)
(3)
VARIABLES
Agreements Agreements
Agreements

(4)
Agreements

No Arbitration
(dummy)

0.390***
(0.0369)

0.394***
(0.0372)

0.397***
(0.0372)

0.394***
(0.0372)

Conventional Arb.
(dummy)

-0.0718*
(0.0372)

-0.0701*
(0.0376)

-0.0713*
(0.0377)

-0.0703*
(0.0376)

Final-Offer Arb.
(dummy)

-0.183***
(0.0355)

-0.187***
(0.0355)

-0.189***
(0.0355)

-0.187***
(0.0355)

Risk Preferences Group
(dummy)

0.0444
(0.0284)

Period within treatment

0.00431
(0.00764)

0.00432
(0.00766)

0.00427
(0.00764)

Spring-Fall Experiment
(dummy)

0.0687
(0.0482)

0.0459
(0.0469)

0.0672
(0.0485)

Female/Male Ratio

-0.0372
(0.0457)

-0.0714
(0.0465)

-0.0420
(0.0458)

Period within session

-0.000800
(0.00272)

-0.000681
(0.00273)

-0.000743
(0.00272)

Last treatment
(dummy)

0.153***
(0.0534)

0.151***
(0.0536)

0.152***
(0.0534)

Average number of safe
choices

-0.0303***
(0.00707)

Average risk order within
a session
Observations
1,316
Number of Session
8
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

-0.0102**
(0.00444)
1,316
8

1,316
8

1,316
8
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Table 3.7 OLS model and time fixed effect model estimates
(1)
(2)
Distance from 500
Distance from 500
VARIABLES
of the final offer
of the final offer
Risk preferences group
(dummy)

-2.438
(3.151)

-1.857
(2.889)

Type – Seller/Buyer
(dummy ; Buyer=1)

15.60***
(3.286)

14.72***
(2.976)

Period within treatment

-2.054***
(0.687)

-1.462**
(0.714)

Female/Male
(dummy ; Male=1)

-0.883
(3.215)

-2.343
(4.542)

Agreement in t-1

-3.717
(4.048)

-5.758
(3.465)

Dist. of the draw in t-1

0.140*
(0.0729)

0.128
(0.0916)

Dist. of the outcome t-1

-0.0406**
(0.0176)

-0.0369
(0.0295)

Dist. of the counterpart
offer in t-1

-0.0349
(0.0516)

-0.0767
(0.0609)

Constant

9.086
(7.286)

8.762*
(5.003)

391
0.130

391
0.138

Observations
R-squared

Time fixed effects
NO
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

YES
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3.7

Appendix

Experiment Instructions (first stage)
This is an experiment in decision-making. Please read the following instructions carefully.
The amount of money that you earn in this experiment will depend on your decisions.
Your screen will show 15 lines with a choice each, between two options: A and B. The
decisions are listed on the left (like in the image below).

Each decision is a paired choice between "Option A" and "Option B." You will
make 15 choices and record these in the final column, but only one of them will be used
in the end to determine your earnings. Before you start making your 15 choices, please let
me explain how these choices will affect your earnings for this part of the experiment.
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There is a bingo cage containing 15 balls (for the first draw) and 20 balls (for the
second draw). The balls have a number from 1 to 15, and 1 to 20 respectively. At the end
of the experiment there will be two drawings, the first to select one of the 15 decisions to
be used, and a second one to determine what your payoff is if you chose option B for that
decision. Even though you will make 15 decisions, only one of these will end up
affecting your earnings, but you will not know in advance which decision will be used.
Obviously, each decision has an equal chance of being used in the end.
For example, please look at Decision 5 (Line 5). Option A pays $1 for sure.
Option B pays $3 if the second ball is 1,2,3 or 4, and $0 if the second ball is 5,6,7…,20.
The other decisions are similar, except that as you move down the table, the chances of
the higher payoff for option B increase.
To summarize, you will make 15 choices: for each decision row you will have to
choose between Option A and Option B. You may choose A for some decision rows and
B for other rows, and you may change your decisions and make them in any order. When
you are finished, click the “Submit” button. After you click the “Submit” button, you will
not be able to change your choices. At the end of the experiment, we will use a bingo
cage to determine what decision we will use for your payment and what your payoff is if
you chose Option B for that particular decision.
Before you start to make your decisions, you will have to answer to couple of quiz
questions about these instructions. The answers for these questions will NOT affect your
earnings at all and they are just to be sure that you understood the instructions.
Are there any questions? Please do not talk with anyone while we are doing this.
If you have any questions before starting and during the experiment, please raise your
hand now and an instructor will come to you.
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Instructions (second stage)
You have been randomly assigned as Player B (Player A) for the remainder of
this experiment. You will have a new randomly chosen counterpart Player A (Player B),
for following of the next periods. You and your counterpart will be given 1 minute in a
decision-making period to mutually agree upon the size of a variable, X. The time will be
displayed in the upper right hand corner of your screen.
Your range of possible X values lies from 200 to 700 (300 to 800) in increments
of one (this may not be the same range as that of your counterpart). The value of X at the
end of the period will determine your cash earnings for that period.
For a Player A, the cash earnings for any given period are larger for larger values
of X. For a Player B, the cash earnings for any given period are larger for smaller values
of X.
The payoff table below translates the different values of X into earnings in US
dollars. Please study this payoff table carefully so that you fully understand how your
earnings will vary given the different possible values of X.
Player A
Player B
Value of
Value of
X
Payoff
X
Payoff
300 $0.00
200 $2.50
350 $0.25
250 $2.25
400 $0.50
300 $2.00
450 $0.75
350 $1.75
500 $1.00
400 $1.50
550 $1.25
450 $1.25
600 $1.50
500 $1.00
650 $1.75
550 $0.75
700 $2.00
600 $0.50
750 $2.25
650 $0.25
800 $2.50
700 $0.00
All integer values for X are possible, and those not shown in the table provide
payoffs between those shown.

58
If you and your counterpart mutually agree upon the size of X for that period, then
your payoff table indicates how much you will earn for that period. In a few moments we
will discuss what will happen should you and your counterpart not be able to come to an
agreement by the end of the allocated time. Your interaction with your counterpart will
only occur through the computers. You will never know the identity of your counterpart
and your counterpart will never know your identity.
The next screen shows the environment in which you will interact with your
counterpart. In your interactions with your counterpart, you will submit your proposal for
the size of X on this screen:

To enter a proposal for X, in the “New Offer” box, enter a value for X and then
click “New offer” button. Your offer will be displayed in the middle box, called “My
offers”, in the order that you enter them, from top to bottom. These values will be
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displayed also in the same order for your counterpart, in his/her third box (from left to
right) called “Counterpart’s offer”. The offers that your counterpart makes to you will be
displayed in your box “Counterpart’s offer”. At any time you can choose only the last
offer (offers at the top of the list) that your counterpart made by clicking on that offer and
then the button “Accept”. If he/she makes a new offer you will not be able to accept the
previous one. The same rule is valid for your counterpart. He/she will be able to accept
only the last offer that you made. Offers can be updated at any time, but it may be wise to
give the other player a few moments to either accept your offer or update his/her offer.

If you choose to accept your counterpart’s offer, a confirmation window will pop
out and ask you to confirm your acceptance of this offer. If you click the “No” button
then the offer is not accepted and you can continue to make and receive offers. If you
click the “Yes” button, the offer is accepted and a screen with the final result and the
payoff for that period will be displayed and the period is over. But if you take too much
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time between when you click the “Accept” button and the “Yes” button for confirmation,
and you counterpart makes a new offer in the meantime, then you will not be able to
accept this offer, even if you click “Yes” button on the confirmation window. As
mentioned above, you are able to accept only the last offer made.
Once the period is over, either another period of similar interactions will occur, or
new instructions will follow for the subsequent period(s). At the end of every period you
should write down the information shown on your results screen on your Personal Record
Sheet, then click the “OK” button.

The computer will keep track of your cumulative experimental earnings and
display them on your screen at the end of each period. You will also have a timer on the
screen showing you how much time is left in a particular period. Please take a moment to
locate these items on your screen. The instructions will inform you what will happen in
the case that you and your counterpart do not reach an agreement within the time limit.
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Part 1
For the next several periods, the following procedure is used if you and your
counterpart do not reach an agreement by the end of the period. Should you reach the end
of the period without having mutually agreed upon a value for X, you will then be
prompted for a final offer. If your and your counterpart’s final offers are equal, then that
is the value of X for the period. If they cross (i.e. Player A’s offer is smaller than Player
B’s offer), then X will be the average of these final offers. If there is still no agreement
(i.e. Player A’s offer is greater than player B’s offer), then you will both receive $0 for
that period. This does not affect any of your previous earnings, nor does it apply to future
earnings (future periods of the experiment). It is important for you to understand this rule.
Before you start the decision-making periods regarding value of X, you will have
to answer to couple of quiz questions about these instructions. The answers for these
questions will NOT affect your earnings and they are just to be sure that you understood
the instructions.
This procedure for addressing situations with no agreement at the end of the
period will continue until you are otherwise notified. If you have any questions before
starting this set of periods, please raise your hand now.
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Personal Record Sheet

Period
Your final offer
Agreement (Yes/No)
Counterpart final
offer
Result of the period
Earnings this period
Total profit

63
Part 2
For the next several periods, the following procedure is used if you and your
counterpart do not reach an agreement by the end of the period. Should you reach the end
of the period without having mutually agreed upon a value for X, you will then be
prompted for a final offer. If your and your counterpart’s final offers are equal, then that
is the value of X for the period. If they cross (i.e. Player A’s offer is smaller than Player
B’s offer), then X will be the average of these final offers. If there is still no agreement,
the computer will use a value, let’s call it Y, for you and your counterpart. This value Y
will determine what value of X will be chosen for that period. Some values of Y are more
likely to be chosen than others, but there is a random element to the computer’s choice.
Whatever the value of Y the computer randomly chooses, that will also be the value of
X used to determine both your and your counterpart’s payoffs for that period.
Example :

To give you some information about this random number generation procedure,
the next table shows you 100 values of Y using the exact same method that will be used
in your case. The order of these 100 values of Y is irrelevant.
Again, if you and your counterpart have not reached an agreement by the end of
the period, you will be prompted for a final offer. If your final offers still do not indicate
an agreement (i.e. Player A’s offer is greater than player B’s offer), then the same random
number generation procedure that chose these 100 values of Y will be used to determine
your value of X for that period.
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100 random draws of Y
461

494

531

543

499

546

503

458

521

506

487

496

522

510

495

477

455

457

525

498

510

545

491

477

519

511

478

515

493

442

607

542

509

541

533

493

468

495

506

487

583

543

476

449

533

534

571

494

465

446

460

520

527

497

474

467

482

543

466

525

591

464

466

493

502

501

522

509

503

473

522

522

468

510

464

517

494

506

522

503

498

549

476

509

467

533

527

548

578

484

521

515

412

474

500

546

477

476

480

509

Before you start the decision-making periods regarding value of X, you will have
to answer to couple of quiz questions about these instructions. The answers for these
questions will NOT affect your earnings and they are just to be sure that you understood
the instructions.
This procedure for addressing situations with no agreement at the end of the
period will continue until you are otherwise notified. If you have any questions before
starting this set of periods, please raise your hand now.
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Personal Record Sheet
Period
Your final offer
Agreement (Yes/No)
Counterpart final
offer
Result of the period
Earnings this period
Total profit
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Part 3
For the next several periods, the following procedure is used if you and your
counterpart do not reach an agreement by the end of the period. Should you reach the end
of the period without having mutually agreed upon a value for X, you will then be
prompted for a final offer. If your and your counterpart’s final offers are equal, then that
is the value of X for the period. If they cross (i.e. Player A’s offer is smaller than Player
B’s offer), then X will be the average of these final offers. If there is still no agreement,
the computer will use a value, let’s call it Y, for you and your counterpart. This value Y
will determine what value of X will be chosen for that period. Some values of Y are more
likely to be chosen than others, but there is a random element to the computer’s choice.
Whichever person’s final offer is closer to the value Y will be chosen as the final
outcome for X, used to both you and your counterpart payoff for that period.
Example 1:
Assume that Player A’s final offer was 30, Player B’s final offer was 20 and Y=22.
Player B’s offer is closer to the value Y than Player A’s offer. Therefore the value for X
for this period will be equal to Player B’s final offer, X= 20.

Example 2:
Assume that Player A’s last offer was 30, Player B’s last offer was 20 and Y=26. Player
A’s offer is closer to the value Y than Player B’s offer. Therefore the value for X for this
period will be equal to Player A’s final offer, X= 30.
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To give you some information about this random number generation procedure,
the table below shows you 100 values of Y using the exact same method that will be used
in your case. The order of these 100 values of Y is irrelevant.

461
487
510
607
583
460
591
522
498
521

494
496
545
542
543
520
464
522
549
515

531
522
491
509
476
527
466
468
476
412

100 random draws of Y
543
499
546
510
495
477
477
519
511
541
533
493
449
533
534
497
474
467
493
502
501
510
464
517
509
467
533
474
500
546

503
455
478
468
571
482
522
494
527
477

458
457
515
495
494
543
509
506
548
476

521
525
493
506
465
466
503
522
578
480

506
498
442
487
446
525
473
503
484
509

Again, if you and your counterpart have not reached an agreement by the end of
the period, you will be prompted for a final offer. If your final offers still do not indicate
an agreement (i.e. Player A’s offer is greater than player B’s offer), then the same random
number generation procedure that chose these 100 values of Y will be used to determine
your value of X for that period.
Before you start the decision-making periods regarding value of X, you will have
to answer to couple of quiz questions about these instructions. The answers for these
questions will NOT affect your earnings and they are just to be sure that you understood
the instructions.
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This procedure for addressing situations with no agreement at the end of the
period will continue until you are otherwise notified. If you have any questions before
starting this set of periods, please raise your hand now.

70
Personal Record Sheet

Period
Your final offer
Agreement (Yes/No)
Counterpart final
offer
Result of the period
Earnings this period
Total profit
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Part 4
For the next several periods, the following procedure is used if you and your
counterpart do not reach an agreement by the end of the period. Should you reach the end
of the period without having mutually agreed upon a value for X, you will then be
prompted for a final offer. If your and your counterpart’s final offers are equal, then that
is the value of X for the period. If they cross (i.e. Player A’s offer is smaller than Player
B’s offer), then X will be the average of these final offers. If there is still no agreement,
the computer will use a value, let’s call it Y, for you and your counterpart. This value Y
will determine what value of X will be chosen for that period. Some values of Y are more
likely to be chosen than others, but there is a random element to the computer’s choice.
The result for X for that period will be:
-

if Player B’s offer is closer to the value of Y: X will be equal to the value of Y
minus twice the difference between Player A’s offer and the value of Y.

-

if Player A’s offer is closer to the value Y: X will be equal to the value of Y
plus twice the difference between the value of Y and Player B’s offer.

In other words, the value of X will be even more favorable to an individual than her
last offer, if that person has a final offer closer to the value of Y than her counterpart.
Example 1:
Assume that Player A’s last offer was 30, Player B’s last offer was 20 and Y=22. Player
B’s offer is closer to the value of Y than Player A’s offer. Then the value for X for this
period will be equal to the value of Y minus twice the difference between Player A’s
offer and the value of Y:
X=22-[2*(30-22)]=6.
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Example 2:
Assume that Player A’s last offer was 30, Player B’s last offer was 20 and Y=26. Player
A’s offer is closer to the value of Y than Player B’s offer. Then the value for X for this
period will be equal to the value of Y plus twice the difference between the value of Y
and Player B’s offer:
X=26+[2*(26-20)]=38.

To give you some information about this random number generation procedure,
the next table shows you 100 values of Y using the exact same method that will be used
in your case. The order of these 100 values of Y is irrelevant.
Again, if you and your counterpart have not reached an agreement by the end of
the period, you will be prompted for a final offer. If your final offers still do not indicate
an agreement (i.e. Player A’s offer is greater than player B’s offer), then the same random
number generation procedure that chose these 100 values of Y will be used to determine
your value of X for that period.
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100 random draws of Y
461

494

531

543

499

546

503

458

521

506

487

496

522

510

495

477

455

457

525

498

510

545

491

477

519

511

478

515

493

442

607

542

509

541

533

493

468

495

506

487

583

543

476

449

533

534

571

494

465

446

460

520

527

497

474

467

482

543

466

525

591

464

466

493

502

501

522

509

503

473

522

522

468

510

464

517

494

506

522

503

498

549

476

509

467

533

527

548

578

484

521

515

412

474

500

546

477

476

480

509

Before you start the decision-making periods regarding value of X, you will have
to answer to couple of quiz questions about these instructions. The answers for these
questions will NOT affect your earnings and they are just to be sure that you understood
the instructions.
This procedure for addressing situations with no agreement at the end of the
period will continue until you are otherwise notified. If you have any questions before
starting this set of periods, please raise your hand now.
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Personal Record Sheet

Period
Your final offer
Agreement (Yes/No)
Counterpart final
offer
Result of the period
Earnings this period
Total profit
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CHAPTER 4. FAIRNESS AND ARBITRATION MECHANISMS

4.1

Introduction

In this paper I present a model of an arbitration mechanism that includes
inequality aversion between disputants. Previous theoretical models show that for
different arbitration mechanisms, two risk-neutral disputants with identical beliefs about
the choice of the arbitrator as a fair settlement will reach an agreement. In my model, if
the two disputants are inequality-averse, as in Fehr & Schmidt (1999), and if they have
optimistically biased beliefs about the size of the pie that they try to split, they will not
reach an agreement. Thus, inequality aversion might explain the low agreement rates
observed in laboratory experiments for different arbitration mechanisms.
In the literature on arbitration mechanisms there are different explanations as to
why mechanisms that are designed to help two disputants reach an agreement do not
always reach their goal. Stevens (1966) says the Conventional Arbitration (CA) gives the
two disputants the incentive to make final offers that diverge instead of converge because
the arbitrator usually splits in two the difference between these final offers. To eliminate
this incentive, Stevens (1966) proposes Final Offer Arbitration (FOA). Ashenfelter at al.
(1992) conduct a laboratory experiment and show that FOA has lower agreement rates
than CA. Brams and Merrill (1983) show for FOA that if the two disputants are risk-
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neutral and the fair settlement of the arbitrator is a random draw from a known
distribution function, the final offers do not converge to an agreement and thus the two
disputants do not reach an agreement by themselves. Brams and Merrill (1983) show for
different distribution functions that the final offers are almost two standard deviations
apart. As a conclusion, Brams and Merrill (1986) propose Combined Arbitration
(CombA), which is a combination between CA and FOA. The theoretical prediction for
this arbitration mechanism is that if the two disputants are risk-neutral, the final offers
converge to the median of the distribution function that describes the beliefs about the
fair settlement of the arbitrator. Other arbitration mechanisms, such as Double-Offer
Arbitration (DOA) proposed by Zeng et al. (1996) and Amended Final Offer Arbitration
(AFOA) proposed by Zeng (2003) have a similar theoretical prediction. Zeng (2003) also
proposes a more general case of AFOA called Alpha-Final Offer Arbitration (α-FOA).
To my knowledge these new mechanisms have not been applied in the field, but
laboratory experiments such as the one described in Chapter 2 and other studies
(Dickinson (2004), Dickinson (2005), Deck et al. (2007)) show that the agreement rate is
much lower than the predicted one. An explanation for this lower agreement rate is that
the models assume that the disputants are risk-neutral and that they have identical
expectations about the arbitrator’s choice of the fair settlement. Dickinson (2003) shows
how the existence and the size of the contract zone (the region of outcomes that is
mutually preferred to arbitration with certainty by disputants) depends on the risk
preferences of the disputants and on their beliefs about the choice of the fair settlement of
the arbitrator. Dickinson (2003) also shows that the disputants might fail to reach an
agreement because of these two factors. Dickinson (2009) conducts a laboratory
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experiment to study the effect of these two factors and concludes that both of them can
decrease the agreement rate.
The Chapter 3 experimental paper ranks the subjects on their risk preferences in
order to avoid situations in which the contract zone does not exist, and in which there is
thus no agreement between disputants. The variance of the distribution function that
describes the arbitrator’s fair settlement is low in this experiment in order to induce
disputants to have identical beliefs about the arbitrator’s choice of a fair settlement. But
even controlling for these two factors, the agreements rate for α-FOA is very low for the
more risk-averse group of subjects compared to the theoretical prediction: around 35%
instead of 100%.
In most experimental studies there is also a treatment called No Arbitration that
does not involve arbitration and in which the disputants receive a payoff of $0 if they do
not reach an agreement by themselves. The theoretical prediction is that the disputants
should reach an agreement 100% of the time, and that they should accept any offer made
by their counterpart. However, even for this treatment, which does not involve risk or an
arbitrator and beliefs about her choices of a fair settlement, the agreement rate is still
lower than predicted. In this study, as in most previous experimental studies, the
agreement rate is around 75%. This indicates that in addition to factors such as type of
arbitration, risk preferences of the disputants or their beliefs about the arbitrator’s choice
of a fair settlement, there are also other factors that influence the outcome of the dispute.
Results from other bargaining games, like an ultimatum game, have similar
deviation from predictions of the standard model. Different papers like Fehr & Schmidt
(1999) or Cox et al. (2007) use different social preferences to explain these differences.
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In the model of this paper I include inequality aversion as another explanatory factor for
the lower agreement rates achieved by proposed arbitration mechanisms. If the utility
function takes into account the inequality aversion and the disputants have optimistically
biased beliefs about the size of the pie, the final offers of the two risk-neutral disputants
do not lead to an agreement anymore. However, this result holds only under the nonstandard assumption that the inequality aversion coefficient has different values if the
outcome is the result of the negotiation rather than is the result of arbitration. Although
the Cox et al. (2007) model allows some flexibility for the emotional state function and
avoids such an assumption, this model does not offer tractable solutions for this
application.
4.2

Literature review

The No Arbitration treatment is similar to a strike. There are two disputants who
have a period of negotiation to agree upon the value of a variable X. The value of
variable X determines how the economic pie is split between the two disputants. For one
disputant higher values of X imply better payoffs, while for the other disputant lower
values of X imply better payoffs. If the two disputants do not reach an agreement once
the negotiation period is over, their payoff is equal to $0. Because of strategic effects in a
game that is played more than once between the same disputants, the optimal strategy
might be not to accept any offer made by the counterpart, which leads to no agreements
in early periods of the game. However, in a one-shot game if any strictly positive payoff
is offered, the two disputants should reach an agreement, as any agreement will result in
a better payoff than $0. The results from experiments show that in such situations there
are more than 20% of disputes in which the two disputants do not reach an agreement.
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Such disagreements cannot be explained by the risk preferences of the subjects or by their
beliefs about the choice of the arbitrator like in the other treatments. One factor that
might explain these disagreements is inequality aversion.
Güth et al. (1982) conduct the first experiment of a simplified version of an
ultimatum game. The game has two players (proposer and responder) and two stages. In
the first stage player 1 (the proposer) receives an amount of money and has to decide how
much she will keep and how much she will give to player 2 (the responder). In the second
stage player 2 can keep the amount received or reject it. If she rejects the offer, both
players receive a payoff of $0. The subgame perfect equilibrium prediction is the player 1
offers nothing (or almost nothing) and player 2 accepts any positive offer. Contrary to the
theoretical prediction, in most of the economic experiments involving the ultimatum
game, player 1 offers on average 30%-40% of the pie with the mode at 50% and player 2
often rejects offers below 20% (Camerer et al. (1995)).
Forsythe et al. (1994) run an experiment to explain if the difference between
experimental results and theoretical predictions can be explained by strategic behavior or
by fairness. In one treatment the subjects play a dictator game instead of the ultimatum
game. The dictator game is a modified version of the ultimatum game, in which player
1’s split of the pie is the final outcome of the game and player 2 does not have any choice.
The distributions of offers in the two treatments (dictator game and ultimatum game) are
different, which implies that fairness cannot explain the entire difference between the
experimental outcomes and the theoretical predictions in ultimatum games. In the dictator
game the amount offered by player 1 moves towards the theoretical prediction. On the
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other hand player 1 still offers nontrivial amount of money, which implies that there are
social preferences that lead player 1 to offer a positive amount to player 2.
Güth et al. (1998) conduct a similar experiment in which they try to distinguish
between strategic behavior and fairness by changing the information that player 2
receives. Their experiment is similar to the ultimatum game but includes 3 players: the
proposer, the decider and a passive player. In the first stage player 1 decides how to split
the pie between the three of them. A message is sent to the decider about the split of the
pie and player 2 decides to accept or reject the offer. The difference between treatments is
the information that the message contains. In one treatment (full information) the
message has the shares of the pie for each player. In the second treatment (essential
information) the message contains only the share for player 2 and in the last treatment
(irrelevant information) the message contains only the share for player 3 (the passive
player). The results of the experiment show that the proposer offers only marginal
amounts to the passive players and small shares to the decider in the irrelevant
information treatment. One of the authors’ conclusions is similar to the one from the
dictator game: high offers in the ultimatum game are not entirely because of fairness, but
rather because the proposer tries to appear fair. However, the proposers are not
completely selfish.
To explain why in certain situations, such as the ultimatum game, a public goods
game with punishments, or gift exchange games standard self-interest models cannot
explain the empirical results, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) consider inequality aversion.
Their utility function includes two types of inequality aversion. For a two-player case, a
person has a decrease in her utility function if her payoff is smaller than the other person
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and also has a smaller decrease in her utility function when her payoff is bigger than the
payoff of the other person:
(

)

The authors assume
The assumption

{

}

and

{

}

( )

.
implies that a person has a stronger dislike for a

disadvantageous split of the pie than an advantageous split of the pie. The assumption
implies that there are not subjects that get some positive utility from being better
off than the counterpart. The assumption

implies that there are not subjects that

are willing to give up more than $1 in order to reduce the difference by $1. Situations in
which there are subjects that break these three assumptions are very implausible.
One important result of the paper is that in a market with competition, such as in
an ultimatum game with multiple proposers or multiple responders, the inequality
aversion effect disappears and the outcome is similar to the standard model of selfinterested agents. Another result is that, given that the proposer has beliefs about her
opponent’s parameter

and given that these believes are described by a discrete

distribution - which is consistent with previous experimental results - it is possible to
calculate the optimal offer of the proposer as a function of her own parameter

. The

result shows that it is not optimal to offer less than 33% of the pie even if the proposer is
completely selfish. This is consistent with the results from experiments that show that
offers below 25% are rare. Furthermore, the value of the parameter

can be elicited

using the dictator game. List (2007) mentions that “the dictator game represents the
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workhorse within experimental economics, frequently used to test theory and provide
insights into the prevalence of social preferences.”
While this model takes into account the final outcomes of the two players, it does
not take into account other factors, such as player intentions toward the counterpart
(hostile or kind, self-interested or not) or the institution of the game, which might change
the two players’ behavior.
Blount (1995) investigates the ultimatum game in a setting in which the opponent
is non-human (the choice of the opponent is a random draw made by a computer) and in
which the choice of how to split the initial amount is made by a neutral-third party (with
no self-interest), as opposed to a self-interested player, as in the standard game. In her
experiment the subjects receive a 3- or 4-page instruction which includes three questions.
The subjects have to complete each page before they moved to the next one. The first
page explains the ultimatum game to the students. For each treatment, player 1 is a selfinterested person, a neutral third-party or a computer-simulated player. The first
treatment of the experiment is a standard ultimatum game. Two subjects are randomly
matched and randomly assigned as a player 1 (“proposer”) or player 2 (“decider”). Player
1 decides how to split $10 between them and player 2 decides to accept or reject the offer.
In the second treatment the two subjects are randomly matched, but the decision of how
to split the $10 between the two subjects is made by a neutral-third party and not by
player 1. Player 2 still can accept or reject the offer. In the last treatment the neutral thirdparty is replaced by a lottery that has equal probability for each possible allocation of the
endowment between the two subjects.
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Page 2 has a question related to the beliefs of the subjects about how the offers
will be distributed across all possible outcomes if 100 players are in the situation
described by that specific treatment. On page 3 subjects have to write the minimum offer
that they would accept if they were randomly assigned as player 2 (“decider”). For the
first treatment there is also a fourth page on which the subjects have to write what offer
they would make if they were randomly assigned as player 1 (“proposer”).
The third treatment has a lower mean of minimum acceptable outcomes than the
other two treatments ($1.20 compared to $2.91 in treatment 1 and $2.08 in treatment 2).
Tests show that there is a statistically significant difference in means.
List (2007) and Bardsley (2008) show that institution in a dictator game is very
important. Both papers offer a set of choices for player 1 which includes the action of
taking money from player 2’s initial endowment. List (2007) extends Bardsley (2008)’s
design by introducing another origin of the initial endowment (in one treatment the
subjects perform a task in order to earn their initial endowment) and by varying the
maximum amount of money that player 1 can take from player 2. Both authors find that
such manipulations in the set of actions change the behavior of the subjects. However, as
in previous studies, no matter what the set of actions is, the subjects do not choose the
most selfish outcome.
The main assumption of my model is related to the change in institutions between
the negotiation stage and arbitration. During negotiation, if an agent accepts an offer she
takes into account the split of the pie offered by her counterpart (who is seen as a selfinterested person). If she goes for arbitration, she takes into account the split of the pie
that is determined by the arbitrator (a random draw in arbitration experiments). Because
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of this change in the institution of the game, I assume that each agent has different
inequality aversion coefficients ( ) during the two stages.
One difference between a standard ultimatum game and arbitration is related to
the information about the size of the pie. In most ultimatum games both players know
exactly the size of the pie that they should split. In contrast, in arbitration, the subjects
generally only have information regarding their own payoff. When a firefighter
negotiates his contract, he does not know what the size of the pie is. He only has beliefs
regarding what a fair wage for him is. The same situation occurs with an injured person
that asks for compensation. In laboratory experiments each player has information about
her payoff function, but not the counterpart’s payoff function. Kagel et al. (1996)
examine an ultimatum game with incomplete information. In this experiment two
subjects participate in an ultimatum game and have to split a number of chips. These
chips have different conversion rates for player 1 and player 2. Because of these
conversion rates the experimenter is able to offer information about the payoff functions
to one of the players or to both players. Depending on which player receives information
about the conversion rates, the amount offer by player 1 and the rejection rates vary.
The case of No Arbitration treatments in which the two subjects do not reach an
agreement during negotiation and need to submit final offers is similar to the social
dilemma called the resource dilemma. The resource dilemma has the following setting:
there are

players and a common resource of size . Each player makes her request

from this resource. After all members make their request, if

,

each of the subject receives her request. Otherwise, each of them receives nothing. As in
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the situation described in the previous paragraph, incomplete information about the size
of the pie leads to lower provision rates (which is similar to higher disagreement rates).
Budescu et al. (1992) conduct an experiment involving a resource dilemma with
simultaneous or sequential requests with incomplete information about the size of the
resource. The Nash equilibrium solution for the simultaneous game with uncertainty
about the size of the resource is derived by Rapoport and Suleiman (1992). The
simultaneous request setting for two players is exactly like the final offers stage of the No
Arbitration treatment in an arbitration experiment. In their experiment there are groups of
five subjects. The size of the resource is drawn from a uniform distribution defined on the
closed interval [

]. There are three distributions:

and

. One result of this paper is that increasing the uncertainty of the

,

size of the resource leads to lower provision rates. This result, together with the result of
Kagel et al. (1996), suggests that disagreement in disputes solved by an arbitration
mechanism should also depend on information that the subjects have about the size of the
pie.
4.3

The model

Theoretical papers about arbitration mechanisms assume that the disputants are
risk-neutral and they prove if the two disputants’ final offers converge to reach an
agreement or not. The literature has found that for DOA, CombA and α-FOA, two riskneutral disputants will reach an agreement by themselves. In the following model I
include also the inequality aversion. I calculate the certainty equivalent for α-FOA and
CA (the most promising arbitration mechanisms), and show that, contrary to previous
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theoretical predictions, the two disputants do not always reach an agreement by
themselves.
Consider a setting in which there is a “seller” and a “buyer” who negotiate over
the value of a variable . For the seller, higher values of
while for the buyer lower values of

increase her utility function,

increase her utility function. If the buyer and seller

do not reach an agreement after a period of negotiation, one of the arbitration methods
(either α-FOA or CA) is applied. Under arbitration, the fair settlement of the arbitrator is
a random draw from a distribution function with cumulative distribution ( ) (

)

continuous. Both disputants are risk-neutral and exhibit inequality aversion, so that their
utility function is described by Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) utility function:
(
where

)

{
and

}

{

}

( )

.

Given this utility function I calculate the certainty equivalent for the seller and
buyer under α-FOA and CA. I then compare the two final offers,

,to see if these

values indicate that the two disputants have reached an agreement or not.
For α-FOA Zeng (2006) proves that two
only if

offers form an equilibrium if and

and:
( )

∫

((

)

)

( )

( )

(

∫

((

)

)

( )

( )

)
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The value of
equivalent

that makes equation 2 hold with equality is the seller’s certainty

(the value that makes her indifferent between arbitration and accepting

that offer). Similarly, there is a certainty equivalent for the buyer
values of the certainty equivalent are compared, if

. When the two

then there is no value that

satisfies (3) and (4), and thus there is no equilibrium strategy (i.e. the two disputants do
not reach an agreement).
Assumption 1: The two disputants have different coefficients of inequality
aversion
(

when they consider an outcome as a result of an offer from the counterpart

) compared to an outcome as a result of a choice of the arbitrator (
The inequality

), and

.

implies that an agent is willing to accept a lower offer

from arbitration (a random draw) than from her counterpart.
Assumption 1 is crucial to these results. This assumption is non-standard in the
literature on inequality aversion. A different approach, which would avoid such an
assumption, would be to use the Cox et al. (2007) model of reciprocity and fairness.
Unfortunately, the Cox et al. (2007) model does not offer tractable solutions for this
application. I include a more detailed discussion of this approach at the end of this section.
However, Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) model with this assumption is similar to the Cox et
al. (2007) model in which

(where α is the coefficient from the Cox et al. (2007)

model that describes the curvature of the indifference curve) and in which the emotional
state function (
and

) takes two values:

if the outcome if determined by the arbitrator

if the outcome is determined by negotiations. This can be viewed as an attempt to

capture social preferences related to the manner in which the final outcome is obtained.
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Thus, despite the fact that the assumption of varying α’s is not common in the literature,
it is closely related to previous work employing an emotional state function, as described
above.
Given that the size of the pie that the two disputants try to split is , and that
, the utility function for the “seller” is:
( )

{

(
(

)
)

( )

Case 1:
As described in Chapter 2, α-FOA is similar to a second-price auction. If the two
disputants do not reach an agreement during the negotiation stage, they must submit their
final offers. If these final offers still do not imply an agreement, then the arbitrator makes
her choice of a fair settlement. The disputant that has the final offer closest to this fair
settlement wins the arbitration. The final outcome of the arbitration depends on the value
of the fair settlement of the arbitrator and on the final offer of the loser of the arbitration.
The equation that gives the value of the final outcome is the following:
|
where

is the arbitrator’s fair settlement value and

|

( )
is the final offer of the loser.

The sign is positive if the winner is the seller and negative if the winner is the buyer. The
CA’s final outcome is equal to the value of the fair settlement, so that CA is a degenerate
case of α-FOA, where

Thus, for this model I consider the more general case of α-

FOA.
The certainty equivalent for α-FOA is given by the following equality:

90

( )

((

∫

)

)

( )

( )

where ( ) is the distribution function that describes the beliefs about the arbitrator’s
choice of the fair settlement.
Observation: Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Zeng (2003) each use α as a parameter,
but with different meanings.

In order to avoid confusion, I change Zeng’s (2003)

notation from α to .
( )
((

∫

(
)

)

)((

(

(

)

( )

( )

∫ [(

where

)

) (

)
)

)
(

]

( )

)

( )

is the expected value of ( ).

To calculate the certainty equivalent, I set equation (8) equal to equation (9):
(

)

Solving for

(

) (

)

(

)

, the certainty equivalent is:
(

) (

(

(

In the CA case (

)
))

(

(

))

(

)

(

)

) the certainty equivalent is equal to:
(
(

)
)

(

)
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) the solution is

If subjects do not exhibit inequality aversion (

for both types of arbitration. Using the same logic for the buyer results in
This implies that

So there is a value

that satisfies the

conditions from Zeng (2006) for an equilibrium offer. The same result holds when the
). This result is due to the fact that if the subjects

Assumption 1 is broken (
exhibit inequality aversion and
( )

functional form than

As Zeng (2006) shows,

, the utility function takes a different
, but is still a utility function for a risk-neutral person.
is a Nash equilibrium strategy for any general utility

function that describes a risk-neutral person.
Given Assumption 1,

can still be equal to

. Assuming that

if equation (10) is equal to :
(
(

) (

)

(
Solving for

))

(

(

results in

(

))

)

. This implies that the two disputants still reach

an agreement by themselves if the arbitrator’s expected choice of fair settlement is not
biased towards one of the disputants:
the utility function is

( )

This is possible due to the fact that even if
(

), if

, the second term of the

function that involves inequality aversion is equal to 0.
However if the seller has optimistically biased beliefs about the size of the pie
, even if the arbitrator’s choice is not biased, replacing

with

results

in:

(

(

))

(

)
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By symmetry, it implies that the buyer also wants a share of the pie bigger than .
Because

, there is no to satisfy equations (3) and (4). In this case the two

disputants do not reach an agreement by themselves.
It worth mentioning that this is a different type of biased beliefs than the one
described by Dickinson (2003). Dickinson (2003) assumes that the disputants have biased
beliefs about the choice of a fair settlement of the arbitrator. In other words, there are
two different distribution functions

( ) and

( ) that describe this fair settlement.

Even if the two disputants choose to play the Nash equilibrium strategy - which is the
expected value of the distribution function that describes their own beliefs - it might be
the case

In such a case, the two disputants will not reach an agreement. This is

the case when the disputants have optimistic beliefs about the choice of the fair
settlement. In this model the two disputants have the same beliefs about the distribution
functions

( )

( )

( ) that describe this fair settlement. But because the

disputants are now inequality-averse, they also have beliefs about the size of the pie. If
the disputants have optimistically biased beliefs about the size of the pie, then it results in
no contract zone, and thus in no agreement.
However, it is not necessary for both players to have biased beliefs about the size
of the pie in order not to reach the agreement. For example, without loss of generality if
only the buyer knows the size of the pie (

) , it results in

. But

so the two disputants still do not reach an agreement.
Proposition 1: If the 2 disputants have different coefficients of inequality aversion
with

, and if at least one of the disputant has optimistically biased beliefs

,
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about the size of the pie, the two risk-neutral disputants do not reach an agreement under
α-FOA.
As I mention in Section 1 of this chapter, in real cases and in most arbitration
laboratory experiments, the disputants do not know the size of the pie that they have to
split. In the experiment presented in Chapter 3 the sellers and the buyers have
information about their own payoff functions but do not have any information about the
payoff function of the counterpart. This result is similar to what Kagel et al. (1996) find
for an ultimatum game and Budescu et al. (1992) find for a resource dilemma when
subjects do not have perfect information about the size of the pie.
This result can explain why in the No Arbitration treatment subjects prefer a
payoff of $0 to an offer that they might think represents an unfair split of the pie. It can
also can explain why risk-neutral subjects do not reach an agreement under α-FOA and
choose instead to go to arbitration.
In the case when the arbitrator’s choice of fair settlement is biased in the sense
that the seller gets an expected share of the pie less than
using the same logic as above implies

(

(

(

case the buyer gets an expected value from arbitration equal to
that, for the buyer,

and

(

equivalent in this situation results in:

)

(

),

))

. But in this
. This implies

). Calculating her certainty

94
(

) (
(

(

(

)
)

)

(

(

)

(

)

)
(

)

In this situation it is ambiguous if

and if there is any value

)
that

satisfies equations (3) and (4) because there is no argument that suggests if
(

(

) )

has a positive or negative sign. Even if it has a positive sign (implying

that the buyer will have a certainty equivalent similar to the one in figure 3.2), whether or
not there is a contract zone depends on relative size of

(

(

) )

. It can be shown, however, that when

(

)

,

compared to
so there is no

contract zone and the two disputants will not reach an agreement.
Proposition 2: In the case when the arbitrator’s choice of fair settlement is biased
and the two disputants have different coefficients of inequality aversion

, with

, it is ambiguous if there is a contract zone or not under α-FOA. If

, then

there is no contract zone, so that the two disputants do not reach an agreement.
For the case of CA the results hold, because, as mentioned above, CA is the case
of case of α-FOA where
Case 2:

.
. This case is the situation presented in the previous paragraphs

but reversing the role of the seller and buyer.
As noted above, Assumption 1 is not common in the literature. As such, I would
like to relax this assumption if possible. However, as I will now describe, relaxing this
assumption by using the Cox et al. (2007) model of reciprocity and fairness leads to an
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intractable solution for the certainty equivalent. This solution does not provide a
functional form that allows one to make any predictions regarding the value of the
certainty equivalent relative to the expected value of the distribution function that
describes arbitrator’s choice of fair settlement. It is therefore impossible to determine
whether or not a contract zone exists. Thus, I believe Assumption 1 is necessary to make
progress on the questions of interest.
Cox et al. (2007) consider a two-player game with perfect information. The first
mover,

receives a payoff

function of

and the second mover

. The utility

has the following functional form:
(
(

where

receives a payoff

)

)

{

(

)

(

]

is the emotional state of the player and is a function of status

Reciprocity is ( )

( )

where

(

)

and reciprocity .

( ) is the maximum payoff the second mover

can guarantee himself when the first mover chooses

and

( ), where

is

neutral in some appropriate sense. In addition to the curvature of the utility function, one
difference between this and the Fehr and Schmidt (1999)’s model comes from the fact
that Cox et al. (2007) assume that a player gains utility from his own income, and either
gains utility or is neutral regarding the other player’s income.
In arbitration both players make offers or accept offers, so there is no first or
second mover. This assumption is important in order to determine the functional form for
status

and reciprocity . One might make the assumption that in the last moment of

negotiation both players are second movers because they have the time to accept the offer
of the counterpart, but not to make additional counteroffers. Given this assumption the
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next step is to calculate the certainty equivalent for each player. This implies solving the
following integral:
{[(

∫

)

]

(

) [

(

)

] }

( )

(

)

Because of the coefficient , which describes the curvature of the utility function,
the integral does not offer a tractable solution. To obtain a convenient form for utility
function, consider

, which implies linear utility curves, similar to Fehr and Schmidt

(1999). In this case the utility function proposed by Cox et al. (2007) becomes similar to
the utility function Fehr and Schmidt (1999) when
(

)

(

)

(
(

:

)
)

(

)

(

)

Further it is important to describe the functional form of the emotional state
function (

). Because both players are second movers, there is no difference in status

between players, which implies
While

. The reciprocity variable is ( )

is a parameter of the model,

( )

.

( ) represents the maximum that a player can

obtain when the counterpart offered him . In this application, under the assumption that
there is no time for a counteroffer, a player that has received an offer of
more than , so ( )

can obtain no

. This functional form is the same assumed by Cox et al.

(2007) for the ultimatum game. This implies that the emotional state function is equal to
(

)

(

). Under these assumptions integral (16) can be solved. However, the

solution for the certainty equivalent does not offer a closed-form solution that is
comparable with the expected value. Thus it is impossible to determine whether or not
there is a contract zone.
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Using various parameters values, such as those from Chapter 3 and values
estimated by Cox et al. (2007)), I am able solve the model numerically. However, the
numerical results do not offer a reasonable economic interpretation. I thus conclude that
while the model of Cox et al. (2007) does not need Assumption 1, this model does not
offer a tractable solution for my application.
4.4

Conclusion

Under the arbitration mechanisms of DOA, CombA and α-FOA two risk-neutral
disputants should reach an agreement according to existing theory. However, laboratory
experiments show that all three mechanisms offer low agreements rates and that only αFOA is able to obtain higher agreements rate than CA. These low agreements rates
cannot be fully explained by the risk preferences of the disputants or by their optimism
about the arbitrator’s choice of the fair settlement. This idea is supported by the fact that
in the No Arbitration treatment described in Chapter 3 and similar studies the disputants
do not reach an agreement and prefer a payoff of $0 even if any amount offered by the
counterpart is better than $0.
In this paper I propose separate factor that can change subjects’ behavior and
prevent them from reaching an agreement: inequality aversion. The model described in
this paper includes inequality aversion and assumes that disputants have different
coefficients of inequality aversion when they consider an outcome as the result of an
offer from the counterpart rather than the result of a choice of the arbitrator. The model
predicts that under α-FOA or CA two risk-neutral disputants will not reach an agreement
if at least one of them has optimistically-biased beliefs about the size of the pie that they
will share. This is contrary to the previous predictions of theoretical models that do not
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include inequality aversion, and offers a possible explanation for the low agreement rates
observed in experimental settings.
As in most of the papers about arbitration mechanisms, this one assumes that the
disputants are risk-neutral, while in fact some of the subjects are risk-averse. While
assuming that the subjects are risk-averse might not change the existence of a contract
zone, the size of the contract zone may differ when the model includes risk aversion and
inequality aversion. Future research should try to compare the size of the contract zone
under α-FOA or CA when the model takes into account risk aversion and inequality
aversion with the contract zones from Zeng (2006).
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Figure 4.1 The certainty equivalent in case of biased beliefs about the size of the pie
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Figure 4.2 The certainty equivalent in case of biased choice of the arbitrator
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CHAPTER 5. PRICE STRUCTURE IN A TWO-SIDED MARKET MONOPOLY –
AND ECONOMICS EXPERIMENT

5.1

Introduction

The network effects literature (Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1994)) shows that due to
externalities, the utility generated by the consumption of a good might depend on the
number of consumers of that good. When a person buys a telephone, that person will take
into account the number of people that have telephones. She does not get any utility from
the telephone if no one else uses them. There are also post-purchase externalities. People
who would like to purchase a car would like to have access to auto parts and auto repair
shops. A person has a better chance to find auto parts if more consumers bought the same
model as she did. One of the main assumptions in this literature is that only one type of
consumer exists and the network effects affect only this type of consumer. However, in
the credit card market, for example, there are two different types of agents: merchants
(the sellers) and buyers (the consumers). If more merchants accept credit cards as a
method of payment, then more buyers would like to have and use credit cards. On the
other hand, a larger number of buyers that hold credit cards will influence more
merchants to accept credit cards as a method of payment.
Recently Armstrong (2006), Armstrong and Wright (2007), Caillaud and Jullien
(2003), Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006) and Hagiu (2009) presented theoretical models
for the case of network effects with cross-group externalities. To date there is little
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empirical work regarding this literature (Chakravorti and Roson (2006)), other than the
case of the credit card market. In one such paper, Kaiser and Wright (2006) estimated a
model of competition in the magazines market using a data set that covers 18 magazine
markets from Germany. My study presents the design and the results of an experiment
investigating the effects of different policies in a two-sided market monopoly on the price
structure and on the consumer surplus.
The optimal price structure in this type of market has specific properties that are
important for policy makers. In a one-sided market a firm is not allowed by law to charge
a price below cost, since a firm could adopt predatory pricing to force the competitors to
exit the market or limit price to cause them to not enter the market. In a two-sided market,
however, a firm might choose to charge one type of agents a price below cost in order to
increase the number of this type of agents, which would lead to an increase in profit from
the other type of agents. Thus, the theoretical models predict that, depending on cost and
demand, the optimal price may be below cost on one side of the market even for a
monopolist with no threat of new entry. The total consumer surplus (the surplus of the
agents from both sides of the market) might also increase compared to the situation in
which the monopolist is not allow to charge a price below cost. This indicates that policy
makers should take into account the type of the market with consumption externalities,
one sided or two-sided, in order to differentiate a predatory pricing strategy in a onesided market and an optimal price structure strategy in a two-sided market. This
experiment will implement a two-sided market monopoly in order to provide empirical
evidence to investigate actual pricing behavior in a controlled setting. In the parameter
environment of the base model, the predicted price for type A agents is 50% less then
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cost per-agent but the platform is able to make a positive total profit in both the short run
and long run. The results from the experiment are consistent with these predictions in the
sense that subjects charge a price below cost on one side of the market even if there is no
threat of new entry.
The experiment also investigates the results of three different policies on the
prices that a monopolist charges the two types of agents. If a policy maker does not
identify the market as a two-sided market, she might prohibit prices below marginal cost.
This policy would have the effect of increasing the price on the side where the price was
below cost and decreasing the price on the other side of the market. Because of the
increase in price on their side of the market, fewer agents on that side will join the
platform. This will lead to fewer agents on the other side of the market even though the
price on their side of the market decreases. In the end this policy might lead to a decrease
in consumer surplus. Another constraint that the policy maker might impose is that the
monopolist must charge the same price on both sides of the market. For example dating
websites, like eHarmony.com or Match.com, have to charge the same price for both
women and men. Especially in a market with strong cross-group externalities, this
constraint leads to a strong distortion of the optimal price structure, which will lead to a
decrease in total consumer surplus. The last policy that this study investigates is the effect
of a tax or subsidy on price structure. In a one-sided monopolistic market an increase in
cost due to a tax leads to an increase in price. If the policy maker applies a tax that leads
to an increase in cost on the side of the agents that most value the other type of agents,
the effect is the same as in a one-sided market: the prices on both sides of the market
increase. But a tax that leads to an increase in cost on the side of the agents that value the
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other type of agents less leads to an increase in price on that side of the market, but a
decrease in price on the other side of the market. The results of the experiment confirm
these predictions.
5.2

Terminology

The platform. In this literature, the firm that helps the two types of agents to
interact is called the “platform”. It is common to say that the agents “join the platform” in
order to explain the fact that the agents decided to buy the good or service from a
particular firm that will help the agents to interact. Some examples of platforms in two
sided markets are: credit card associations like VISA and MasterCard, websites like
Amazon.com and eHarmony.com, and video consoles like Wii and PlayStation.
Single-homing and multi-homing. The agents can join one platform or multiple
platforms. Armstrong (2006) uses the term “single-home” to describe the situation in
which an agent chooses to use just one platform, and when the agent chooses several
platforms, the agent is said to “multi-home”. In the newspaper market, most readers will
choose to read only one newspaper. So the readers single-home. But in the same market,
the advertisers will like to reach all readers, so they will publish their ads in multiple
newspapers. The advertisers multi-home.
Competitive bottlenecks. Depending upon whether a side of the market is singlehoming or multi-homing, there are three possible situations: when both sides are singlehoming, when one side is single-homing and the other is multi-homing and when both
sides are multi-homing. Armstrong (2006) says that we might not expect the last case.
His argument is that if one side of the market speaks both English and French, there is no
reason for the other side to learn both English and French, because knowing just one of
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these languages is enough to interact and communicate with the other side. Indeed there
are not many cases in which both sides multi-home. Armstrong (2006) refers to the case
in which on side single-homes and the other multi-homes as a “competitive bottleneck”.
In this case, the multi-homing agents have no choice but to deal with the platform that
was chosen by each single-homing agent from the other side.
5.3

Literature Review

Evans (2003a) has a review of this type of market and presents some specific
businesses that are described as two-sided markets. Evans has a more detailed
presentation in “The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets.” Another
paper that is interesting as an introduction to this field is Wright (2004). This paper
presents some differences between one-sided and two-sided markets through eight
fallacies that a policy maker might face if he applies one-sided logic in two-sided markets.
These fallacies are illustrated through several real life examples, from reports of different
institutions, including the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) and the Australia
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). The reports concern pricing rules in
the credit card market and show how a wrong approach (the logic from one-sided markets)
can make things worse or have no effect. The second fallacy of the paper states: “A high
price-cost margin indicates market power” (p.47). Even in a very competitive market, if
there are cross-group externalities, we can observe a high price-cost margin on one side
of the market. As in Wright (2004), he uses nightclubs as an example of this phenomenon.
Nightclubs will compete to attract more women that will then bring more men to join the
platform by setting a lower price for women. But at the same time the platforms set a
higher price for men due to the benefits that women bring to the men, not because of
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market power. A more balanced price structure will not necessarily attract more users to
join the platform and the platform’s profit may be lower. But ACCC and RBA state in
their report that: ”Competitive pressures in card payment networks in Australia have not
been sufficiently strong to bring interchange fees into line with costs” (p.56). This
example is also related to the third fallacy of the paper, which states: “A price below
marginal cost indicates predation.” Using Wright’s example, we can observe that even in
a monopoly case, a nightclub might charge women a price below cost to increase the
number of the women that attend the club. The increase in number of women will attract
more men and will increase the overall profit. So a platform may charge a price below
cost not because it wants to compete very aggressively against competitors, but because
that it is the optimal price structure.
Genakos and Valletti (2012) also have a short review of the recent literature
related to the “waterbed effect” of the price structure in mobile telephony as a two-sided
market. This study has two important conclusions regarding regulating prices in twosided markets. The first one underlines the fact that two-sided markets are special
markets and policy makers should be more careful when they try to regulate such markets.
On the other hand, prices in a competitive two-sided market might differ from the
socially-optimal prices and require a more regulatory oversight rather than less, like in a
one-sided market.
Hagiu (2007) has a similar approach, but he presents a theoretical model that
studies the choice of an intermediation agent to be a “merchant” or a two-sided platform.
In “merchant mode”, the third-party buys the goods from the sellers and then sells them
to the consumers. In “two-sided mode”, the third-party just helps the sellers and the
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buyers to interact, without buying the goods. A good example of a firm that is a twosided platform is Amazon.com. Although Amazon.com started to maintain its own stocks
of goods, its main business is to bring together two types of agents, sellers and buyers.
Amazon.com does not buy the goods, but it helps these types of agents interact and
charges them different fees. The choice between being a “merchant” or a two-sided
platform depends on different factors. The main ones are:


indirect network effects between buyers and sellers; when the probability
of unfavorable seller expectations if other sellers join the same platform is
high enough, the merchant is able to internalize the network effects and
the “merchant” mode is preferred to the two-sided platform.



asymmetric information between sellers and the third-party; when the
sellers are more efficient at distributing their own products (for example, it
is impossible for eBay to have accurate knowledge about all goods’
markets and all the goods that are sold on this website), then the platform
is preferred to the merchant mode.



investment incentives; the producers of the videogame console chose to be
a platform and they charge the game developers royalties. They don’t buy
the game software from the game developers because they want to give
some incentive to the game developers to improve the game. If the cost of
the improvement is relatively low for the platform, then the platform
might buy the game software and will choose to be a merchant.
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product complementarity/substitutability; the merchant is able to
internalize the complementarity (substitutability) between sellers’ products,
so the merchant mode is preferred to the platform one.

The analysis and the results of Hagiu (2007) hold for monopoly. As the author
mentions, a competition model should raise more strategic issues, but his paper does not
analyze this situation.
Caillaud and Jullien (2001) present a basic model of intermediation. Their study
focuses especially on intermediation via the internet, but the paper is a first step in
approaching two-sided markets more broadly. As they mention, a more complete analysis
of the equilibrium is provided by Caillaud and Jullien(2003). The latter study presents a
competition model of intermediation providers (platforms). The authors consider two
homogeneous populations, each consisting of a continuum of mass one of identical
agents. The agents get utility by finding a match with an agent of a different type.
Without the platform, the agents are not able to find a match (therefore their utility is
zero). If both types of agents join a platform, the platform has a probability

to find

a match for any agent. Each of the two platforms charge a registration fee

and a total

transaction fee

. If the user can register with at most one platform an efficient

allocation of the users is one in which all users will register with the same platform. If all
users choose one platform (and the other one is inactive) then the equilibrium is called
“dominant-firm equilibrium”. In order to keep the other platform inactive, the dominant
platform should choose such prices that no divide-and-conquer strategy will provide
positive profit for the second platform. With exogenous single-homing there are only
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dominant-firm equilibria, where one platform captures all agents on both sides, charges a
maximal transaction fee, subsidizes registration and makes zero profit. If we allow for
multi-homing and pure equilibria (their definition of “pure equilibrium” is an equilibrium
in which agents of the same type all make the same choice), there is a global multihoming equilibrium if and only if (
only if (

)

)

or a dominant-firm equilibrium if and

, where is the marginal cost. For a mixed equilibrium (where users

of the same type can make different choices) there is no equilibrium with both platforms
active and no multi-homing if

. If there is no transaction fee (as in the case when

it is difficult to monitor transactions), a dominant-firm equilibrium exists if and only if
(

)

, where
and

is the share of the total net surplus of the agent of type i, so
(Caillaud and Jullien assume that type-2 agents have a

better bargaining position). Another important result for the case of competitive
bottlenecks is that the single-homing side is subsidized while the multi-homing side has
no surplus.
Rochet and Tirole (2003) show that the choice of the model for a platform (which
side of the market should be charged more or subsidized, and whether to charge a fixed
fee and/or a per-transaction fee) is a key factor in the success of the business. They
propose a model for a monopoly platform and competitive platforms. The main
difference from Caillaud and Jullien (2003) is that the two types of agents are
heterogeneous. The surplus that the agents get from a transaction on the platform is
for one type, named “buyers”, and

for the other type, named “sellers”. This leads to

different elasticities on the two sides of the market. They take as given the matching

112
process, so the volume of the transactions is equal to
a “quasi-demand function”3, for

(

)

(

), where

( ) is

. One more difference is that in the first part of

the paper, they assume that the platform only charges a per-transaction fee and no fixed
fee. They also consider fixed costs for platform and fixed fees for agents.
For the monopoly case, the optimal prices charged by the platform are given by
the formula:
( )
where

are the elasticities of the quasi-demands. We can observe that the agents

that have a higher elasticity will be charged more by the monopoly platform. The formula
is similar to the Lerner formula.
For the competition model with a symmetric equilibrium, the optimal prices are:

(

( )

)

where

is own-brand elasticity and

is the single-homing index. Rochet and Tirole

define

as a proportion of “loyal” consumers, i.e. consumers that will stop trading when

the platform i is not available anymore, and
structure, it follows that
to

[

] Because of the symmetric price

. When all buyers single-home, which is equivalent

, the own-brand elasticity and demand elasticity coincide, and we get the same

formula as in the monopoly case.
If platforms also charge a fixed fee, the symmetric equilibrium prices are given by:

3

The phrase “quasi-demand function” is used to reflect the fact that, in a two-sided market, actual demand
depends on the decision of both types of agents (buyers and sellers). In their specification, this demand is
simply the product of the quasi-demands of buyers and sellers.
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(
where

)

(

is network elasticity and

assume single-homing, i.e.

( )

)

is cross-price elasticity (the authors

).

Armstrong (2006) is closely related to Rochet and Tirole (2003). The difference
between these two articles is how the authors treat the heterogeneity of the agents, the
structure of fees charged by the platforms and the cost of the platforms. The utility of an
agent that joins a platform is:
( )
where

is the benefit of the agent when she interacts with a different type agent,

the number of agents of a different type that join the platform, and

is

is her benefit from

joining platform . Regarding the heterogeneity of the agent, Rochet and Tirole (2003)
assume that
assumes

depends on and , but

doesn’t depend on and . Armstrong (2006)

doesn’t depend on and , but

depends on and . Regarding the price

structure, Rochet and Tirole(2003) assume that the platform charges only a pertransaction fee and not a fixed fee. Armstrong assumes that the platform charges a fixed
fee. Because Rochet and Tirole (2003) assume a per-transaction fee, the cost for the
platform is

, while Armstrong (2006) assumes a fixed fee, so the cost of the

platform is equal to

.

For the monopoly case, Armstrong (2006) assumes that there are two types of
agents, denoted 1 and 2, and that each agent cares about the number of agents from the
other group ( ). Then each agent’s utility is:
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( )
where

are the prices that the platform charges each agent of the two groups and

measures the benefit of agent i when she interacts with an agent j.
Assuming that the platform incurs a per-agent cost
(

)

(

, the platform’s profit is:
)

( )

In terms of utility and given the notation:
( )

( )

the platform’s profit is:
(

)

(

)[

(

)

]

(

)[

(

)

]

( )

Using the last equation, the optimal prices are:
( )
( )

( )

The formula says that the price charged on one side of the market is equal to the
cost of providing service on that side minus the external benefit of the other side plus a
factor that is related to the elasticity of the demand. We can observe that if the external
benefit of the other side is bigger than the elasticity factor, the price is below the cost
(that side of the market is subsidized). And if the external benefit has a high enough value,
the price can be negative. Given the formula of elasticity, Armstrong obtains a result
similar to Rochet and Tirole’s (2003) result and the formula of the prices is similar to the
Lerner formula:
(

)
( |

)

(

)
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where

is the price elasticity of demand for one type of agents given a level of

participation of the other type.
For the competition model, with two platforms, Armstrong (2006) uses a
Hotelling model specification. In the first case that he approaches he assumes
exogenously that agents will single-home. The two platforms, A and B, are situated at the
end points of a unit interval. The agents are uniformly distributed and the transportation
costs for the two types of agents are
2 will have the utility {

and

. If the agent joins platform i , groups 1 and

}. Given the number of agents that a platform attracts and

the prices that the platform charges, the utility of each agent is:
(

)

When each group has to choose between the two platforms, Armstrong assumes
that the number of each group that will join a platform i is given by the Hotelling
specification:
(
Using equations (11) and (12) and solving the simultaneous equation for

)

and

, the market shares are:
(

)

(

)

(

)

(

)

(

)

(

)

The platform i’s profit is:
(

)

(

)
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[

)

(

[

(

)

)

(

](
)

)

](

)

(

)

From the first order conditions, Armstrong (2006) obtains the following formula
for the prices:
(

)

(

)

The first term on the right side is the cost, the second one is the market power, the
third represents the extra agent of type-k that joins the platform when an agent of type-i
joins the platform and the last term represents the profit from an extra type-k agent.
Solving the system of these two equations, the equilibrium prices are:
(

)

Again, if we write the last formula in terms of own-price elasticity, the results are
similar to the Lerner formula:
(

)

(

)

Comparing this with the monopoly formula, the duopolist places twice the weight
on the external benefits for a group when it sets the price for the other group.
For the case when one side is single-homing and the other is multi-homing
(competitive bottlenecks), the platform will choose a price for the multi-homing side that
will bring on the platform the number of agents from the multi-homing side that will
maximize the total surplus of the platform and single-homing agents, while the interest of
multi-homing agents is ignored. This result is similar to Caillaud and Jullien (2003), who
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find that single-homing agents (the “buyers”) will be subsidized, while multi-homing
agents (the “sellers”) will have no surplus.
Armstrong and Wright (2007) study the case of platform competition, also using
the Hotelling model. They show that if there is strong product differentiation on both
sides of the market, and if the transportation costs are higher than the benefits that agents
obtain from interacting with the other side of the market. Then no agent will multi-home
at a non-negative price. In other words, they don’t impose exogenously that the agents
single-home. If product differentiation exists on only one side of the market, then there is
an equilibrium in which the agents from the other side will multi-home. Unlike
Armstrong (2006), they impose a non-negative price constraint. This constraint is
plausible as negative prices are rarely observed in the field. In the most cases when a
platform would like to charge a negative price on one side, usually the platform charges
nothing the agents from that side.
Their model is similar to the Armstrong (2006) competitive model: two type of
agents (buyers and sellers – B and S) interact over two platforms (1 and 2), but the agents
can join one platform (single-home) or both of them (multi-home). Denoting
number of agents of type k who join exclusively platform i and

as the

as the number of

agents that multi-home, the utility of an agent that joins platform 1 and is located at
[

] is:
( )

for
joins any platform,

(
, where

)

(

)

is the utility that an agent gets when she

is the price that platform i charges an agent of type k,

is the
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transportation cost and

is the benefit of an agent of type k when she interacts with an

agent of different type.
If the same agent joins platform 2, then her utility is:
( )

(

)

(

)

(

)

(

)

If she chooses to multi-home, her utility is:
( )

(

)

The platform’s profit is equal with the price charged on each side of the market
the cost of providing the service per-interaction on each side

minus

, multiplied by the number

of agents that join each side:
(

)(

)

(

)(

)

(

)

First, Armstrong and Wright assume that there is strong product differentiation on
both sides. In particular, if

, they prove that no agent multi-homes at

any non-negative prices set by the two platforms (Lemma 1 in their paper). Given this
lemma, they can focus exclusively on the case when all agents single-home. If

is

sufficiently high such that all agents choose at least one platform,
(

and

) , there is a unique equilibrium in which all agents single-home, the

two platforms offer the same prices and half the agents from each group will join each
platform. If the cost per-interaction plus the transportation cost is greater than the benefits
on each side

(the equilibrium price is positive on both sides), the equilibrium

price has a formula similar to Armstrong (2006):
(

)
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But when this inequality does not hold on one side, so the price on one side
should be negative (

), due to the constraint of non-negative prices the

equilibrium price on that side is zero. Moreover, the platforms will compete more
aggressively on the other side since competition is constrained on the side where the price
is zero. Consequently, the equilibrium price on the side with non-zero price will decrease:

[

]

(

)

(

)

Their conclusion is that the more platforms want to set a negative price on one
side, the more they will lower the price on the other side.
The first result is obtained in the same way as in Armstrong (2006) with the
observation that due to Lemma 1 we have

, so the formulas for the

platform’s profit in both papers are the same in this case. For the cases when nonnegative price constraints bind, we have the same profit maximization problem, but with
the relevant constraints

.

Another important result of this paper concerns exclusive contracts. If platforms
are able to offer exclusive contracts to one side (the “sellers”), then one platform can set a
high non-exclusive price and a slightly lower (compared to the rival’s) exclusive price.
The result is that all sellers will sign a contract with this platform. After the platform
attracts all sellers, it is able to charge the other side (the “buyers”) a premium price. This
strategy will undermine the competitive bottlenecks equilibrium. Moreover, it will
reverse the surplus result from the competitive bottlenecks equilibrium. Now, the buyers
are the group that will have all surplus extracted.
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Amelio and Jullien (2012) present a model similar to Armstrong (2006) in which
it is not possible to set a negative price. They relax this constraint, letting the platform to
tie the sale of another good. In a monopoly this technique raises participation and also
increases the consumer surplus. In a duopoly, the change in consumers’ surplus depends
on what will happen on the profitable side: if the competition becomes softer or more
intense. The competition softening leads to an increase in both prices at the equilibrium
which will lead to a decrease in consumer surplus (and the other way around).
Hagiu (2009) shows that another important factor determining the price structure
charged by the platform is consumer demand for product variety. Consumer demand for
product variety gives more market power to the sellers as long as their products are less
substitutable, so the sellers are able to earn greater profits. The platforms realize this and
will try to extract more profits from the sellers’ side of the market. For the monopoly case,
Hagiu (2009) shows that depending on the market power of the sellers ( ), elasticity of
consumers’ demand (

), elasticity of sellers’ demand (

consumers’ preference for variety (

) and the intensity of

), the platform can subsidize one side, or make

positive profits on both sides. Hagiu calculates the optimal price structure as a ratio
between the share of total profits made on sellers

and the share made on consumers

. This ratio4 is equal to:
(
(

)(
)(

(

)(
(

))
))

(

)

Depending upon whether the nominator or the denominator is negative, Hagiu
concludes that:
4

As in Hagiu’s paper, I omit functions’ arguments in order to avoid clutter.
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-

if

-

if

-

if

, the sellers are subsidized;

(

)

, the buyers are subsidized;

(

)

, the platform makes positive profits on

both sides of the market ;
Another two contributions of this paper are: i) Hagiu shows that allowing for the
consumer preference for variety, the strategy in which one platform tries to undercut the
price of the consumers of the other platform in order to attract more consumers and
indirectly more sellers will have a smaller effect in driving away the sellers form the
other platform; ii) Hagiu also shows that in some settings, the platform is indifferent
between a membership fee (fixed fee) and a royalties/usage fee (per-transaction fee) –
these two instruments are perfect substitutes. But when the platform is interested in the
sellers’ (producers’) level of investment, the usage fee plays an important role.
Hagiu (2006) approaches another factor that can change the structure of the
pricing in a two-sided market: commitment. One main characteristic of this type of
market is that the indirect network effects between buyers and sellers will generate the
“chicken-and-egg” problem. In order to avoid this problem, the platforms might commit
ex ante to charge one side a price ex post in order to attract a larger number of agents
from the other side. A good example is when the producers of game consoles announce
the price of the console (the fixed fee paid by the buyers) in order to be able to make the
game developers join their platform and to charge them a higher price.
The timing of his model is consistent with the game consoles market, where
usually the game developers (sellers) decide first to join the platform or not. In this
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situation, the platform has two options: to announce the price for sellers only, and
announce the price for buyers after sellers join the platform; or to announce the price for
buyers (if there is any credible commitment) and the price for sellers at the same time.
These two different strategies will offer different results. The model is similar to Caillaud
and Jullien (2003).
Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2004) present a competition model similar to Caillaud
and Jullien (2003), but with some modifications. In their paper the platforms are
heterogeneous rather than homogenous; the agents can choose not to join any platform,
where Caillaud and Jullien (2003) assume that all agents join at least one platform. They
also assume that the agents only pay a registration fee (fixed fee). As in some of the
papers presented above, Gabszewicz and Wauthy find the equilibrium prices for the
monopoly case, the duopoly case with single-homing and the duopoly case with multihoming.
Roson (2005) and Rochet and Tirole (2006) have short presentations of the
progress in the literature of the two-sided market. Moreover, Rochet and Tirole (2006) try
to develop a more general model and to incorporate the model of Rochet and Tirole
(2003) with pure per-transaction fees and the model of Armstrong (2006) with pure fixed
fees. Another important contribution of Rochet and Tirole (2006) is that they establish a
definition for a two-sided market. A market is a two-sided market if a platform charges a
per-interaction fee of

for buyers and

for sellers, so that the aggregate price level is

, keeping constant the aggregate price
changes as

and

change.

, the total transaction volume
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Gabszewicz et al (2001) study the location of newspapers relative to their political
opinions. They show that newspapers tend to have the policy of “Pensée Unique”. In
other words, they choose a location which is a “middle point” and not an extreme.
Their model uses a Hotelling model in which two newspapers can choose their
political opinion on a unit interval – they can choose their location, where a is the
distance from the far left extreme to the location of the first newspaper and b is the
distance from the far right extreme to the location of the second newspaper. By notation,
the cost per copy of each newspaper is c, t is the intensity of readers’ political opinions
and 4k is the density of the population of advertisers of type θ. Given that the two
newspapers choose their political opinion (a,b), the Nash equilibrium of the game is:
-

(

)

(

-

(

)

(

When

), if
), if
, both strategies are equilibrium strategies, but the

strategy (0,0) Pareto-dominates the strategy (0.5,0.5).
Kaiser and Wright (2006) estimate the market for magazines in Germany and find
that this market behaves like a two-sided market. The results are consistent with the
theory that advertisers value readers more than readers value advertisers. Magazines
subsidize the readers and make a profit by charging the advertisers. Also, this market fits
the model where the agents of the both sides of the market pay a fixed fee (to join the
platform), and not a transaction fee. For estimation, the authors use Armstrong’s (2006)
model.
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Their data set has information about cover prices, ad prices, the number of ad
pages, the number of content pages and the circulation numbers of the magazines in
Germany for each quarter from 1972 to 2003. They group the magazines in different
market segments depending on their content in such a way that they have two magazines
in each market segment. Out of 18 market segments, 9 were ruled out due to different
difficulties.
Due to endogeneity problems, they use instruments for circulation numbers, the
number of content pages, the number of ad pages, cover prices and ad rates. They use
GMM and SUR estimations, and in some cases get quite different results depending on
the particular estimation strategy.
The magazines earn an estimated profit of -2,100,830 Euros per year from readers.
This result shows that readers are subsidized by the platform. At the same time,
magazines earn an estimated profit of 6,911,360 Euros per year from advertisers. Based
on these point estimates, these magazines are able to make a positive profit in total, even
if they have losses on one side.
Chakravorti and Roson (2006) study platform competition using a particular case
of payment networks. One interesting result is related to the fact that market competition
has two effects: a reduction in the total level of the price and a change in the price
structure.
Chakravorti and Roson assume that consumers are charged a fixed fee and sellers
(merchants) are charged a per-transaction fee. The profit for the platform is then:
(

)

(

)

(

)
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where

is the fixed fee charged for consumers,

charged for sellers,

is the number of consumers,

is per-transaction fee
is the number of sellers and g and

c are the fixed costs that the platform incurs for every consumer and seller that join the
platform.
They construct an index related to the total welfare. Given a fixed level of profit
for the platform and a change in prices for consumers and sellers, the index is equal to:
(

)

(

)

(

)

where CW is consumer welfare, and MW is the sellers surplus. A positive value for
means that if there is an increase in

and a decrease in

, keeping profit constant, it is

possible to have an increase in the aggregate welfare. Calculating the value

for given

values for some parameters of the model for duopolistic competition and a monopolistic
cartel, Chakravorti and Roson conclude that competition will increase the pressure on the
total level of prices and will decrease the total level of prices, but will also change the
price structure. These changes can have opposing effects. Due to the decrease in the total
level of prices, there is an increase in welfare. Due to the change in the price structure, a
decrease in welfare for one side may occur. In their settings, the increase dominates the
possible decrease, so overall the consumers and the sellers are better off. This result has
an important policy implication in the credit card market.
Chakravarty (2003) conducts an experiment concerning technology adoption
when there are network externalities. He studies the effects of network size on pricing
and adoption of two competing technologies. Even if there are no cross-group
externalities, his setting is similar to a two-sided market experiment. The theoretical
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model is similar, in some ways to Armstrong (2006). There are two technologies (instead
of platforms) A and B,

homogenous consumers (but just one type of consumer), and

the consumers’ utility depends on the size of the network that the consumer adopts:
(

)

(

)

(

)

(

)

Because there is a two stage game, the size of the network is the sum of the
number of agents that adopt each technology in each stage:

. The consumers are

homogenous so they have the same benefit function ( ). In the experiment, this function
has the following form: ( )

. In Armstrong (2006), for the monopoly model,

the functional form for ( ) is ( )

. If we change the settings of Chakravarty

(2003) and add one more type of agent, the experiment is quite similar to Armstrong’s
model. The model assumes that each technology has a marginal cost of production that
can be different in each stage:

and

. Each session of the experiment has 2

stages and 10 subjects: 2 sellers (one for each technology), 4 buyers for stage 1 and 4
buyers for stage 2. The time line is the following: the sellers set the prices for stage 1, the
stage 1 buyers simultaneously decide which technology they want to buy, and then the
sellers set the price for stage 2 and the stage 2 buyers decide which technology they want
to buy. After that the computer calculates the payoffs for each subject.
Another experimental study that helps in the design of a two-sided market
experiment is Brown-Kruse et al. (1993), which examines spatial competition. The
subjects were paired as sellers (in the two-sided market they can be the platforms). The
consumers (one type of agent) were simulated and uniformly distributed on the interval
[

]. Because the experiment cannot allow a continuum representation of the interval,
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the consumers’ location was at each unit interval. The subjects could choose their
location and were told that the consumers had a transportation cost t. The consumers
were homogenous and each consumer’s demand function was ( )
, where

, where

is fixed FOB price that sellers could charge and d is the

distance to the seller from whom they bought a good. A similar setting can be used in a
two-sided experiment, with the modification that the platforms have a fixed location (at
the end of the interval), but the subjects can choose the price that they want to charge the
agents.
5.4

Experimental design

5.4.1

Model structure

For this experiment, I use Armstrong’s (2006) monopolistic market model.
Armstrong assumes that there are two types of agents, denoted 1 and 2, and that each
agent cares about the number of agents from the other group ( ). Each agent’s utility is:
(
where,

is the price that the platform charges each type of agent and

)

measures the

benefit of agent i when she interacts with agent j. The platform’s profit is:
(

)

(

)

(

)

In terms of utility, Armstrong (2006) assumes the following relationship between
the number of agents on one side of the market and the utility the agents get:
( )
where
( )

(

)

( ) is some increasing function. For simplicity, in my experiment I assume
, where

is a constant. This constant allows for positive number of

agents in the model. Rewriting the demand functions described by (31) and (33), so they

128
are not a function of the number of agents on the other side of the market, the equations
that describe the demand functions (as a function of prices) are the following:
(

I impose restriction (

)

)

so the demand is decreasing in

Given this notation, for the model with no restrictions the optimal prices as a
function of the parameters of the model are:

(

)

Plugging the optimal prices in to the demand functions, the number of agents that
will join the platform at the equilibrium is equal to:

(

Assume that at the optimal price

)

and the monopolist is not allowed to

charge a price below cost. Then the optimal prices are:

and the number of agents that will join the platform is equal to:

(

)

(

)
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(
(

)

(

)

(

)
)

(
(

)
)

(

)

(

)

For the situation when the monopolist is not allowed to charge different prices for
the two types of agents the optimal prices are:
(

(

)

)

and the number of agents that will join the platform is equal to:

(

(

) (

) (

)
5.4.2

(

)

) (

)

Experimental Procedures

The experiment has 4 treatments: a treatment with no restrictions regarding the
prices that a subject can charge (called Base); a treatment in which the prices are not
allowed to be below cost (Above cost); a treatment in which the monopolist is not
allowed to charge the two types of agents different prices (Same price); and a treatment
in which there is a higher cost on the side where the agents’ valuation for the other type
of agents is the lowest (High Cost). There are 3 treatments in each session and the order
of the treatments is different from one session to another. Each treatment has 20 periods.
The first 10 periods are practice periods in order to give subjects the freedom to explore
with no cost their payoff function and only the last 10 periods of each treatment are
considered for payment. Moreover, in order to ensure that the subjects treat each period
with the same amount of importance, only two of the last 10 periods of the each treatment
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are randomly drawn for the final payment. The sum of profits for these periods is the
subjects’ total experimental earnings. Before each treatment starts, the program shows
subjects a screen with the restriction or changes compared to the previous treatment. For
example, before the Same price treatment the screen says: “For the next 20 periods you
must charge type A customers and type B customers the same price.”
For each period, each subject owns a firm and this firm is the only firm in the
market no additional entry allowed. The firm helps two types of agents (in this
experiment called type A and type B customers) to interact. The customers are computer
simulated and they decide if they want to join the business in order to be able to interact
with the agents of the other type. The consumers’ decision to join the business or not
depends on the prices that the firm charges and the number of agents of the other type
that join the business. Each subject must choose what prices to charge the two types of
agents each period. Given these prices and the parameters of the model, equation (34)
gives the number of agents of each type that join the business. Plugging these results in to
equation (32), the calculator displays the profit for that period on the screen. At the end of
each period, the subjects see a screen with the prices that they charged, the number of
each type of agents that joined their business and the profit that they made. The costs, the
prices and the profit during the experiment are in francs. The profit is converted to US
dollars and is paid to each subject at the end of the experiment at a rate of 350 francs to 1
USD. To help subjects to keep track of this information, a history table with the results
from each period is displayed on their decision screen. In figure 4.2 there is a screen shot
with a subjects’ decision screen after 3 periods.
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For this experiment, the parameters of the model are equal to the values from
table 4.1.
The values for the cost per agent

and the constant

are the same for both sides

of the market, in order to guarantee that the results of the experiment are due to crossgroup externalities and the policies imposed in the market. The equilibrium prices and the
equilibrium number of agents for each treatment are presented in the following table:
The experiment was conducted at Purdue University during the spring semester of
2013 using 24 Purdue undergraduate students during 3 sessions of 8 students each.
Session lasted on average 1 hour and 15 minutes and the average payment was
approximately $25 per subject in each session. The program used to run the experiment
was Z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The order of each treatment in each session is presented
in the table 4.3.
Hypothesis 1. Even with no threat of new competitors, the price-cost margin for a
monopoly platform is negative on one side of the market.
This monopoly model highlights that if a platform sets a price below cost on one
side of the market, this does not mean that the platform wants to drive the competitor out
of the market or that the platform wants to create barriers to entry. The platform does not
have a predatory pricing strategy, but by choosing a price below cost on that side of the
market, the platform wants to attract more agents on that side of the market, which will
bring even more agents to the other side. Thus, even with no threat of new competitors, a
monopoly platform sets a price below cost on one side of the market. The agents on that
side of the market will attract more agents of the other type, so the platform will be able
to increase its profit on the other side, and thus its profit overall. Moreover, in such a
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situation the platform can have positive profit in both the short-run and the long-run. For
the Base treatment the predicted price for type A agents is equal to 25 francs while the
cost per costumer on that side is 50 francs. For the Cost increase treatment the predicted
price for type A agents is equal to 61.5 francs while the cost per costumer on that side is
90 francs.
Hypothesis 2. If the equilibrium price on one side of the market is below cost and
the monopolist is restricted to charge a price at or above cost, the total consumer surplus
decreases.
If the equilibrium price on one side of the market is below cost and the
monopolist is restricted to charge a price above cost, then on that side there will be fewer
agents because of the increase in price. The decrease in the number of agents on that side
will lead to fewer agents on the other side also. Even if the monopolist decreases the
price on the other side in order to maximize the profit, the decrease in price does not
compensate for the loss in consumer surplus. Overall the consumer surplus decreases. In
this experimental setting the prediction is that there is a decrease of 66.4% in total
consumer surplus from treatment Base to treatment Above cost.
Hypothesis 3. If the monopolist is restricted to charge the same price on both
sides of the market, the total consumer surplus decreases.
If a policymaker does not recognize a market as a two-sided market, she might
force the platform to charge the same price for both types of agents if the service or good
provided by the platform is the same for every agent. An example is dating websites.
Wright (2004) cites an article from The San Diego Union Tribute that states that a group
of lawyers filled a case against several dating services from California and reached an

133
agreement base on gender-pricing discrimination against men. The dating services
offered discounts for female costumers. Wall Street Journal (Gold, Reddy (2012)) has an
article that states that 138 businesses like nail salons in New York City paid fines for
violating a New York City law against gender-pricing discrimination. While nail salons
are not classified as a two-sided market, dating websites are classified as two-sided
market and they are still required to follow gender discrimination legislation. Websites
like eHarmony.com and Match.com charge the same price both to women and men.
Imposing such restrictions, the prediction in this experimental environment is that the
total consumer surplus decreases by 56.6%.
Hypothesis 4. An increase in the cost per-agent on one side of the market may
decrease the price on the other side.
In a one-sided market, an increase in cost induces an increase in price charged by
the monopolist. In a two-sided market, an increase in the cost per-agent on one side might
induce an increase in prices on both sides or an increase in price on that side and a
decrease in price on the other side. The change in price at the equilibrium on one side due
to a change in cost per-agent on the other side is:
(
Given the parameters in the model
that

if

and

if

, which implies
. Depending on which side of the

market it is applied, a tax on one side of the market has different effects on the price on
the other side. In this experiment, the prediction is that an increase in cost for type A

)
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agents induces a decrease in price for type B agents by 23.5 francs which means a
decrease by 19%.
5.5

Results

As noted above, in order to encourage experimentation and help subjects
investigate and better understand the relationship between the prices they charge and the
profit they make, the first 10 periods of each treatment were not considered for payment.
Due to the lack of financial incentives for these first 10 periods, the statistical tests
presented in this section use data only from the last 10 periods of each treatment. For
better illustration however, some graphs use the data for all 20 periods of a treatment.
Result 1. Given strong cross-group externalities, a monopolist in a two-sided
market charges a price blow cost on one side of the market.
The result is that the average prices are not close to those predicted in equilibrium.
But when the Base treatment is not the first treatment in the session, the average price
charged to type A agents is below cost. Figure 5.5 and 5.6 present the average prices
charged in session 2 and session 3, when the Base treatment was not the first treatment of
the session.
At the individual level only two out of the 16 total subjects in these two sessions
did not charge type A agents a price below cost. Across three sessions, the average price
charged to type A agents for the last 10 periods was 43 francs, while the cost was 50
francs.
Testing the assumptions of a Student’s t-test, Levene's robust test does not reject
the null hypothesis of equal variances between different orders of the Base treatment
within each of the three sessions, however t-tests reject the null hypothesis of equal
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means between session 1 and session 2 (p-value=0.003), and between session 1 and
session 3 (p-value=0.027). Because the sample population of the Base treatment in
session 1 comes from a different distribution, I provide the results of a one-sample onetailed t-test of the null-hypothesis mean price>cost (50 francs) for session 1 separately
from sessions 2 and 3. For sessions 2 and 3 the null hypothesis is rejected (p-value=0.001)
and the mean price charged to type A agents is equal to 36.1 francs. This result supports
hypothesis 1 that a monopolist in a two-sided market with no threat of new entry charges
a price below cost on one side of the market. On the other hand a t-test rejects the null
hypothesis that the mean price is equal to the optimal price of 25 francs (p-value=0.001).
However, for session 1 the null hypothesis is not rejected and the mean price for
type A agents equals 56.6 francs. The lack of experience of the subjects or the existence
of a restriction not to charge a price below cost before Base treatment might affect the
behavior of the monopolist.
Session 1 was the only session that had a mean price above cost for type A agents
above cost, and also the only session in which the Base treatment was the first treatment
of the session. Figure 4.5 presents the average prices per period charged in session 1. The
graph shows that even with no restriction that prohibits setting a price below cost, on
average the subjects did not charge a price below cost, contrary to the prediction of the
model. Looking at the individual choices, figure 4.6 shows that only two out of eight
subjects charged a price below cost (50 francs).
Evaluating the deviation from the equilibrium in terms of payoffs, figure 5.7
shows the profit loss for the Base treatment in all three sessions. Due to the fact that
subjects do not charge prices below cost on side A, despite the fact that the optimal price
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is below cost , there is a bigger profit loss for first session. The profit loss decreases in the
next two sessions, once subjects start to charge a price below cost, consistent with the
equilibrium prediction.
Result 2. A policy that restricts a monopolist to charge prices above cost reduces
total consumer surplus.
Figure 4.7 presents the average consumer surplus per period for the Base and
Above Cost treatments for all three sessions.
Levene's robust test rejects the null hypothesis of equal variances between prices
for type A agents from session 1 and 2 (p-value=0.007), and from session 1 and 3 (pvalue=0.009). Welch's t-tests reject the null hypothesis of equal price means of the Above
cost treatment (for type A agents) only between session 1 and 3 (p-value=0.12), but the
differences between means are not as high as in the Base treatment. Session 3 has the
highest mean price at 58.8 francs, which is 6.8 francs above the mean price in session 1
and 3.5 francs above the mean price in session 2. Similar to the Base treatment, the Above
Cost treatment has a higher mean price for type A agents for the sessions in which the
Above Cost treatment is the first treatment. Thus, no matter what the second treatment is
within a session, the subjects use their experience from the first treatment to charge prices
closer to the predicted prices in the second treatment of the session. The t-test rejects the
null hypothesis that the mean price is equal to the optimal price of 50 francs for session 1
(p-value=0.033), and sessions 2 and 3 (p-value=0.007).
Differences from one session to another session are also observed in terms of the
decrease in consumer surplus across treatments. For the first session there is an average
decrease of 7% in consumer surplus from the Base treatment to the Above Cost treatment.
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For session 2 the average decrease in consumer surplus is 28% and in session 3 is equal
to 21.8%.
In terms of the average consumer surplus, Levene's robust test rejects the null
hypothesis of equal variances between the Base treatment and the Above Cost treatment
(p-value=0.001). Welch's t-test rejects the null hypothesis of equal means between the
Base treatment and the Above Cost treatment (p-value=0.001). A two-sample Wilcoxon
rank-sum test also rejects the null hypothesis of equal means between these 2 treatments
(p-value=0.001). A policy that requires that the prices must be above cost decreases total
consumer surplus in this experimental environment by 18.1%.
Table 4.4 shows the results of random effect model estimation using average
consumer surplus as the dependent variable. The coefficient for the variable Treatment is
statistically significant at the 1% level, which indicates that the average consumer surplus
decreases from the Base treatment to the Above Cost treatment. The coefficient for the
variable Order is also statistically significant at the 1% level which indicates that there is
an increase in consumer surplus when the treatment is run later in the session.
These results support hypothesis 2, that consumer surplus decreases when a policy
requires a price above cost.
The observed decrease of 18.1% is less than the predicted decrease of 66.4%. The
difference between the predicted value and the actual value is explained by the fact that
the average prices in the Base treatment are not close to the predicted prices. For type A
agents the average price of 43 francs is below the cost of 50 francs but is still 18 francs
above the predicted price of 25 francs. On the other hand, for the Above Cost treatment
the average price for type A agents is equal to 55.3 francs, just 5.3 francs above the
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predicted price. This means the subjects were less able to attract an optimal number of
agents under the Base treatment, which implies a lower consumer surplus than predicted
and also a decrease in the difference between the consumer surpluses in the two
treatments.
Similarly to consumer surplus, a small difference in profits that monopolists
obtain is observed between the two treatments. In the first session, when the Above Cost
treatment is not the first treatment, the profit loss is insignificant. Once the order of the
treatments is reversed the average percentage profit loss for the Base treatment is less
than the average percentage profit loss for the Above Cost. Another observation is that
subjects are able to increase the profit within sessions for the Above Cost treatment, while
for the Base treatment profit stays almost the same. The average profit losses in the two
treatments are displayed in figure 5.10.
Result 3. A policy that constrains a monopolist to charge the same price on both
sides of the market reduces total consumer surplus.
This treatment was a search problem in one dimension so it was not difficult for
the subjects to find the equilibrium price. As such, this treatment was only included in
session 1. The average price charged by the subjects is displayed in figure 4.9.
The overall average price for the last 10 periods is equal to 74.9 francs while the
equilibrium price is 75 francs. A Student t-test does not reject the null hypothesis that the
mean price for the Same Price treatment is equal to the equilibrium price (p-value=0.242).
Regarding the average consumer surplus per period, Levene's robust test rejects the null
hypothesis of equal variances between the Base treatment and the Same Price treatment
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(p-value=0.00). A Welch's t-test, that allows for unequal sample sizes, rejects the null
hypothesis of equal consumer surplus means between the two treatments (p-value=0.001).
The decrease in consumer surplus between these two treatments is equal to 10.4%.
This result supports hypothesis 3 that a policy that imposes the same prices for both types
of agents decreases consumer surplus.
In the Same Price treatment subjects choose the equilibrium price, which
indicates that they maximize they profit under this treatment. Figure 5.10 supports this
conclusion.
Result 4. An increase in the cost per-agent on one side of the market induces a
decrease in the price charged to the agents on the other side of the market.
For this treatment there are two important observations. First, the average price in
the last 10 periods charged to type B agents is equal to 98.35 francs. This implies that
there is a decrease in the price for type B agents compared to the price in the Base
treatment, where the average was 108.25 francs. Second, the price charged to type A
agents is always lower than the cost per-agent on that side. The figure 4.12 and 4.13
present the prices charged in the High Cost treatment for the two sessions.
For the prices for type B agents, Levene's robust test rejects the null hypothesis of
equal variances between the Base treatment and the High Cost treatment (p-value=0.02).
A Welch's t-test for unequal sample sizes rejects the null-hypothesis of equal price means
between Base treatment and High Cost treatment (p-value=0.022). The mean price for
type B agents is lower in the High Cost treatment than in Base treatment by 9.9 francs
(9.1%). A two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test also rejects the null hypothesis of equal
price means between the two treatments (p-value=0.01). This implies that a policy that
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increases the cost on one side of the market will decrease the price that the monopolist
charges on the other side of the market. This result supports hypothesis 4.
Related to the prices charged to type A agents, in the High Cost treatment, a onesample t-test rejects the null-hypothesis that mean price>cost=90 francs (p-value=0.001).
Also the null-hypothesis that mean price=predicted price is rejected (p-value=0.11). The
mean price is equal to 66.5 while the predicted price is equal to 61.5 francs. These results
support hypothesis 1, that a monopolist with no threat of new entry charges a price below
cost on one side of the market. However, the subjects do not charge the optimal price.
The difference between the optimal prices and the average prices on the two sides
of the market is reflected in the profit loss. Figure 5.17 presents the average profit loss in
percentage per each period in the two sessions.
5.6

Conclusions

This paper presents the experimental design and the initial results of an economic
experiment that studies the price structure in a two-side market monopoly and the effects
of different policies on price structure and total consumer surplus. Theoretical models,
from the relatively new literature on two-sided markets, show that the optimal price
structure can have such prices that can mislead the policymakers.
In this laboratory environment, the predicted price for type A agents is only onehalf of the per-agent cost for the side of the market that provides a strong demand
externality to the other side. While this can be viewed by a naïve policymaker as a
predatory pricing strategy, results 1 and 4 show that most of the monopolists charged a
price below cost even if they did not have a threat of new competitors.
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However, contrary to the prediction of the model, there were subjects that did not
charge a price below cost under the Base treatment. The only situation when the subjects
charged an average price above cost, even if the optimal price was below cost on that side
of the market, was when the treatment with no restriction on price setting occurred before
a treatment that imposes such restriction. This might have been because of lack of
experience of the subjects. Also the fact that there was initially no constraint on price
before the Base treatment in session 1 can also explain why subjects did not charge a
price below the cost per-agent, close to the optimal price. This implies that platforms with
inexperienced managers might not charge the optimal prices if there is no initial
regulation in the market. If there was a regulation and the regulation is removed, the
prices tend to be the optimal prices. If the goal of a policymaker is to help platforms to
charge the optimal prices, a good strategy for the policymaker is to impose a price
regulation for a short time period and then remove it.
A policy that requires the monopolist to charge a price above cost leads to a
decrease in total consumer surplus, as does a policy that imposes the same price for both
types of agents. The decreases in consumer surplus are not as big as the predicted
decreases, but there still is a statistically significant difference in means. Also a tax that
leads to an increase in the cost per-agent for type A agents, contrary to the effect in a onesided market, decreases the price for type B agents.
The goal of this paper is to offer empirical evidence that will help policymakers to
implement some regulations in such markets. The results prove that two-sided markets
have counterintuitive properties and suggest that policymakers should pay attention to the
type of the market, one-sided or two-sided, and that regular policies might not have the
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desired effects in a two-sided market. Future research should try to find answers to
similar questions for duopoly markets and for mergers.
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Figure 5.1 The case of the competitive bottlenecks
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Figure 5.2 Subjects’ decision screen.
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Figure 5.3 Session 2 – Base treatment
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Session 3: Base treatment - no restrictions
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Figure 5.4 Session 3 – Base treatment
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Session 1: Base treatment - no restrictions
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Figure 5.5 Session 1 – Base treatment
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Figure 5.6 Session 1 – Prices for type A agents for each subject in the Base treatment
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Figure 5.7 Average profit loss for Base treatment
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Average Consumer Surplus

Average consumer surplus per period in Base and Above Cost
treatments in all 3 sessions
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Figure 5.8 Session 1 – Prices for type A agents for each subject in the Base treatment5

5

For a better illustration of the average consumer surplus, I add 8000 units to the values from the data. I
choose 8000 units because it maintains the right proportions of the actual average consumer surplus for
both treatments.
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Average decrease in consumer surplus from Base to
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Figure 5.9 Average decrease in consumer surplus per period from Base to Above Cost
treatment
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Figure 5.10 Average profit loss in Base and Above Cost treatments
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Session 1: Same price treatment - price A = price B
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Figure 5.11 Session 1 – Same price treatment
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Average consumer surplus
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Figure 5.12 Average consumer surplus for the Base and Same Price treatments6

6

For a better illustration of the average consumer surplus, I add 8000 units to the values from the data. I
chose 8000 units because it maintains the correct proportions of the actual average consumer surplus for
both treatments. For the Base treatment the average consumer surplus in each period represents the average
of the consumer surpluses from all 3 sessions for that particular period.
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Figure 5.13 Difference in average consumer surplus per period between the Base and
Same Price treatments7

7

For the Base treatment the average consumer surplus in each period represents the average of the
consumer surpluses from all 3 sessions for that particular period.
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Figure 5.14 Average profit loss in Base and Same Price treatments
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Session 2 : High Cost treatment - cost A increased to 90
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Figure 5.15 Session 2 – High Cost treatment
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Session 3 : High cost treatment - cost A increased to 90
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Figure 5.16 Session 3 – High Cost treatment
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Figure 5.17 Average profit loss for High Cost treatment
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Table 5.1 Values for the parameters of the model
Parameters
Side
Alpha (α) Cost (f)8 Const. (d)
A
0.1
50 (90)
100
B
1.3
50
100

8

For the High Cost treatment the cost on side A increases from 50 francs to 90 francs.
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Table 5.2 The equilibrium prices, the equilibrium number of agents, total profit and total
consumer surplus
Treatment
Equilibrium
Side
Base
Above cost
Same price
High Cost
A
25.0
50.0
75.0
61.5
Price
B
125.0
107.5
75.0
101.5
A
83
57
32
44
Number of
agents
B
83
66
66
56
Profit
4150
3795
2450
1627
TOTAL CS
-2822
-4695
-4420
-4928
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Table 5.3 Order of the treatment in each session
Session
Order of the
treatments
I
II
III
1
Base
Above cost
Above cost
2
Above cost
Base
High Cost
3
Same price
High Cost
Base
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Table 5.4 The effects of imposing a policy that requires prices to be set above cost on
consumer surplus. Random effect model estimates (clustered by session)
(1)
VARIABLES
Consumer
Surplus
Period within session

-29.36**
(13.40)

Treatment
(dummy ; Above Cost=1)

-824.5***
(87.21)

Order of the treatment
within session
Constant

610.6**
(274.9)
-3,822***
(250.9)

Observations
480
Number of session
3
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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5.8

Appendix

Experiment Instructions.
This experiment is about the economics of decision making. The instructions are
simple, and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you may earn a
considerable amount of money which will be paid to you privately in cash at the end of
the experiment.
Your payoff (or earnings) will be determined by your choices. All earnings will
be in terms of francs. 350 francs will be converted to 1US dollar.
The information on your screen is private. Please do not talk to your fellow
participants while the experiment is in progress. This is important to the validity of the
study.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come
to you and answer your question privately.
Description of the market
You own and manage a firm that helps two types of customers interact. We will
call these customers “type A” and “type B”. Your firm is the only firm in the market and
no other firm can enter the market. Each of the two types of customers is interested in
interacting with customers of the other type, but can only do so through your firm, after
paying you a price for it. Your task is to choose the price that each type of customer has
to pay your firm for this service. The price that you charge customers of type A might be
the same price or not as the price you charge customers of type B.
In this experiment, customers of each type are computer simulated. They will
decide if they want to pay for your service depending on two things:
1.

The price you charge them: holding everything else constant, the higher

the price you charge, the less likely they are to use your service (this is true for both types
of customers).
2.

The number of customers of the other type that are also using your service:

holding everything else constant, the likelihood that a customer of type A decides to pay
for your service increases with the number of customers of type B that are currently using
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your service (and the other way around). So if you manage to attract one extra customer
of type A, then your service will become more valuable to every customer of type B, and
this increase in valuation will be the same to EVERY customer of type B (the same goes
the other way around). In today’s experiment holding everything else constant, the
valuation that each type has for the other will be the following: for each additional 10
type A customers that will join your business, 13 more type B customers will join your
business too. But for each 10 type B customers that will join your business just 1 more
type A customer will join your business. That means that type B customers value type A
customers more than type A customers value type B customers.
Example:
During the experiment the number of customers is rounded to the nearest whole
number, but in this example for better illustration the number of customers is rounded to
one decimal.
Assume that there is a firm that charges type A customers 60 francs and type B
customers 60 francs for joining its business. Then there will be 50.6 type A customers
that join the business and 105.8 type B customers that join its business (see the first line
of the next 2 tables). Also assume the valuation that each type has for the other is the one
from the previous paragraph.
First assume that the firm reduces the price for type A customers by 2 francs (see
the second line of the next table), then another 2.3 type A customers will join the business.
But even if the price for type B customers is the same, another 3 type B customers will
join the business because now there are more type A customers in that business. If the
firm lowers the price it charges the type A customers even more, then more type A
customers will join the business. Again, more type B customers will join the business
even if the price for type B customers did not change.
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Example of lowering the price for type A costumers

Period
1
2
3
4

Price that the
business
charges type A
customers
60
58
56
54

Number of type A
customers that
joined the
business
50.6
52.9
55.2
57.5

Price that
business
charges type B
customers
60
60
60
60

Number of type B
customers that
joined the
business
105.8
108.8
111.8
114.8

Now assume that the firm lowers the price for type B customers by 2 francs (see
the second line of next table), you can see that 2.3 more type B customers will join the
business. But because type A customers are less interested in interacting with type B
customers, the increase in the number of type B customers will increase the number of
type A customers by only 0.2.

Example of lowering the price for type B costumers

Period
1
2
3
4

Price that the
Number of type
business
A customers that
charges type A
joined the
customers
business
60
50.6
60
50.8
60
51.0
60
51.2

Price that
business
charges type
B customers
60
58
56
54

Number of type
B customers
that joined the
business
105.8
108.1
110.4
112.7
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(end of the example)
You face a constant cost of 50 francs for each type A customer that joins your
business and a constant cost of 50 francs for each type B customer that joins your
business. The difference between the price that you charge one type of customers (for
example type A customers) and the cost that your firm has for that type of customer (in
this example 50 francs) is the profit per-customer. If you multiply this difference times
the number of customers of that type (type A customers in our example) that joined your
business, you get the profit from that type of customer. The total profit for that period is
the sum of the profit from type A customers and the profit from the type B customers
minus a fixed cost. The fixed cost will be displayed on your screen and it stays constant
during each part of the experiment. However, it may change from one part to the other
part. You do not have to calculate your profit each period; this value will be displayed on
your screen each period.
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General specifications
This experiment will have 3 parts with 20 periods each. In each period you must
choose the prices to charge type A customers and type B customers that join your
business. The first 10 periods of each part will not be chosen for payment, so you may
use those periods to investigate the relationship between the prices you charge and the
profit you make. Two periods will be randomly chosen from the last 10 periods of each
part (a total of 6 periods) and your total earnings in francs will be equal to the sum of the
total profits for these 6 periods.
You will submit your chosen prices for each period using your computer. At the
beginning of each new period the computer will show information about the outcomes
from the previous periods. All that is required from you is to carefully choose the prices
for your firm for each period.
At the end of each period your computer screen will show:
· the prices that you charged each period;
· the number of customers of each type that joined your business each period;
· the profit you earned each period.
Please record this information on the record sheet provided before you click the
“Continue” button.
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Part 1
Period
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Price for
type A
customers

Number of
type A
customers

Price for
type B
customers

Number of
type B
customers

Total profit
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Part 2
Period
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Price for
type A
customers

Number of
type A
customers

Price for
type B
customers

Number of
type B
customers

Total profit
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Part 3
Period
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Price for
type A
customers

Number of
type A
customers

Price for
type B
customers

Number of
type B
customers

Total profit
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Payment:
Period
Part 1
Part 1
Part 2
Part 2
Part 3
Part 3
Total experimental earnings
Total US dollars

Your profit in each period
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